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After approximately forty years as enemies, South Korea and China normalized 
relations in 1992.  This change has accelerated the growth of both of their already 
booming economies.  Beyond that, it has helped propel Beijing into a pivotal role of 
influence since it now maintains friendly relations with both Koreas, currently the only 
country to do so.  Nearly fifteen years after this normalization, South Korea and China 
still enjoy a strong relationship that generally continues to improve.  Surprisingly, North 
Korea does not seem to oppose its staunch ally befriending its primary rival.  This 
improving relationship and the effect it has on both states’ approaches to North Korean 
crises hold vast implications for the changing power structure in the region and for the 
United States’ role in Asia.  This thesis assesses which traditional international relations 
paradigm, Realism or Liberalism, provides the best insights into why South Korea and 
China desire a strong relationship with each other, find stronger support for Liberalism in 
South Korea and for an adapted version of Realism in China.  Furthermore, it examines 
North Korea’s position toward this growing relationship and the implications of it for 
Pyongyang.  Finally, this thesis analyzes the implications for Japan and the United States 
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China and Korea have had a close relationship for over two thousand years.  After 
the 1948 partition of Korea, many Chinese leaders viewed their relationship with North 
Korea as one as close as “lips and teeth.”  Remarkably, fifty years after the brutal Korean 
War, Beijing has developed a strong relationship with South Korea, its bitter archenemy 
during both that war and subsequent Cold War.  During much of that time, some argue 
Beijing’s rhetoric against the South was harsher than that against Taiwan.1  Even more 
remarkable is that Beijing has maintained its close relationship with North Korea while it 
has become increasingly close to South Korea.  Today, China stands as the only country 
able to maintain good relations with both Koreas.  This substantial accomplishment 
leaves China in a coveted position to influence events on the peninsula in ways 
unavailable to other countries.   
A. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the implications for North Korea of the 
growing relationship between Seoul and Beijing, one that will play a major role in events 
such as the Six Party Talks and possible reunification on the peninsula.  This relationship 
has already played an important role in enhancing inter-Korean relations, as can be seen 
through the materialization of the historic 2000 summit between the two Koreas.  At the 
same time, as Sino-Korean relations evolve in the coming decades, so too will the power 
structure in Northeast Asia.  Understanding this relationship will help analysts understand 
and prepare for this future.    
B. IMPORTANCE 
The topic is important for several reasons.  The countries comprising Northeast 
Asia are engaged in a tenuous balance of power at present.  China’s economic growth, 
Japan’s possible remilitarization, Taiwan’s ambiguous desire for independence, North 
Korea’s nuclear program, and South and North Korea’s reunification efforts are just some 
of the issues facing Asia currently.  Beyond that, China’s increasing role in these affairs, 
                                                 
1  Victor D. Cha, "Engaging China: Seoul-Beijing Détente and Korean Security," Survival, 1999, p. 75.  
Evidence for this thesis does not extend beyond October 2005. 
2 
while comforting to some, makes others uneasy.   The geography itself enhances the 
importance of this topic because  
With the Korean peninsula as its strategic pivot, [Northeast Asia] is the 
one and only international region or sub-region where the world’s four 
major powers—China, Japan, Russia, and the United States—uneasily 
meet and interact and where their respective interests coalesce, compete, 
or clash in a situation-specific way.2   
 
Thus, this thesis is important for a range of reasons.   
While the Korean peninsula has served as a geopolitical crossroad throughout its 
two thousand years of recorded history—the peninsula has been invaded more than 900 
times3—North Korea, today, receives far more attention than South Korea.  With its aloof 
attitude toward other countries, its drastic and perplexing moves to acquire aid, and its 
defiant isolationism, Pyongyang garners much concern from the region and from the 
major powers of the world.   
North Korea has managed to stay afloat for more than fifteen years after the end 
of the Cold War despite being exceptionally reclusive and one of the last remaining 
militarized communist states.  With dire famine conditions and negative economic 
growth throughout the 1990s, a nuclear weapons crisis in 1994, and another ongoing one 
that began in 2003, North Korea’s post-Cold War future has looked more and more bleak.  
Yet the regional and international community has, for the most part, partaken in an 
engagement policy rather than a coercive one.  Indeed, arguably, the major actors have 
not prepared responses to an implosion or explosion of the North Korean regime.  The 
United States, in particular, has no specific plan for dealing with a united Korea and the 
changes in the region that will ensue.  This opens the door for Pyongyang to manipulate 
perceptions of the potential opportunities and losses for all sides.  In particular it may use 
the growing relationship between China and South Korea in the upcoming years as it 
fights for its own continued existence. 
                                                 
2  Samuel S. Kim, "Northeast Asia in the Local—Regional—Global Nexus: Multiple Challenges and 
Contending Explanations," in The International Relations of Northeast Asia (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), p. 5. 
3  Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (London: Warner Books, 1999), p.  3. 
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Meanwhile, the nature of the relationship between South Korea and China 
suggests Seoul is bandwagoning with Beijing as opposed to balancing against it.  Seoul’s 
acceptance of China’s growing power in the region holds major implications for other 
players in the region, specifically the United States and Japan.  Thus, not only will this 
relationship play a role in North Korea’s future, but it will also play a role in the general 
behavior of regional states toward each other and how crises are resolved.  All of these 
factors are of critical interest, not only for scholars, but for American (and regional) 
policymakers. 
C. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT 
The major question this thesis answers is:  What are the implications of the 
growing relationship between South Korea and China for North Korea?  In doing so, the 
thesis proceeds through the following four subordinate questions: 
1. What is the relationship between South Korea and China? 
2. Why does South Korea want this relationship with China? 
3. Why does China want this relationship with South Korea? 
4. What are North Korea’s views on this relationship? 
Furthermore, implications for the region as a whole and for the two other major players in 
the region, Japan and the United States, will be considered so as to assess the broader 
consequences of this relationship.   
 The core argument in this thesis is that because of an already established 
relationship between North Korea and China, a strong relationship between South Korea 
and China will help to ensure a smooth and peaceful outcome for all situations on the 
Korean peninsula and subsequently will lead to a more peaceful, stable, and viable Asia.  
In determining why the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) desire a strong relationship with each other, each country’s intentions and 
approaches regarding their foreign policies for the region are illuminated.  At the same 
time, focusing on their reasons for desiring for a strong relationship sheds light on their 
respective intentions toward North Korea and begins to address the implications of the 
relationship for Pyongyang as well.   
4 
Furthermore, however, this growing relationship between South Korea and China 
creates opportunities for North Korea.  The ROK and PRC are substantial donors of aid, 
the main advocates for diplomatic engagement instead of coercion during the current 
nuclear crisis, and the biggest investors in North Korea’s economic reform.  Beyond that, 
they also seem to offer a layer of protection for North Korea from the perceived threats of 
the United States, as they seem to empathize with Pyongyang’s concerns.  Having its two 
closest neighbors’ support is likely to prove advantageous to North Korea.  But it is not 
just their ability to deflect the coercive pressures of the United States that will prove 
beneficial.  Additionally, the strong relationship the ROK and the PRC share creates a 
synergy the United States has so far been unable to penetrate.  If Pyongyang can avoid 
driving away its neighbors, as it has tended to do in the past, this growing relationship 
between China and South Korea will provide an opportunity for Pyongyang to improve 
its economy, thereby strengthening its standing and legitimacy internationally.    
D. METHODOLOGY  
Looking at this situation from the perspective of two traditional international 
relations paradigms, Realism and Liberalism, this thesis determines why South Korea and 
China have each embarked on a quest for a stronger relationship with the other.  This 
analytical format sheds light on their respective intentions for the region and, particularly, 
toward North Korea.  By identifying which paradigm each country uses, analysts can 
better predict future outcomes regarding situations involving North Korea.  These two 
paradigms are succinctly described here. 
1. Realism 
Most realists evaluate the international state of affairs by comparing relative 
levels of power.  Hans Morgenthau, considered the father of modern realism, 
“characterized international politics as a struggle for power…[and was] not content to see 
power as an instrument for the attainment of other ends in a competitive world, but 
[regarded] it also as an end in itself, due to the nature of human beings.”4  Kenneth Waltz 
refined the theory of realism by arguing states seek power as a defense mechanism 
through which a balance of power inevitably emerges.  Waltz contends states, “at a 
                                                 
4  Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," in Neorealism and its 
Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 10-11. 
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minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal 
domination.”5  Most recently, John Mearsheimer would claim in his offensive realism 
theory that states only feel secure and self-preserved if they have power and therefore, 
aggressively aim to acquire it.  “Simply put,” as he says, “great powers are primed for 
offense.”6   
For this thesis, three relevant strategies used in realism theory as put forth by 
Mearsheimer are considered: balancing, bandwagoning and regional hegemony.  
Mearsheimer defines balancing as “preventing an aggressor from upsetting the balance of 
power” through three tactics.  The first, a country attempting to balance against an 
aggressor can, 
 …send clear signals to the aggressor through diplomatic channels…that 
they are firmly committed to maintaining the balance of power, even if it 
means going to war….Second, threatened states can work to create a 
defensive alliance to help them contain their dangerous opponent….Third, 
threatened states can balance against an aggressor by mobilizing 
additional resources of their own.7   
Bandwagoning basically sits at the opposite end of the spectrum from balancing.  
Mearsheimer states a country is bandwagoning when it “abandons hope of preventing the 
aggressor from gaining power at its expense and instead joins forces with its dangerous 
foe to get at least some small portion of the spoils of war.”8  Finally, Mearsheimer 
defines a regional hegemon as a country that “dominates the system… [in] distinct 
geographical areas.”9  He argues that all great powers will strive to be such a hegemon, 




                                                 
5  Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," p. 15.  Keohane quotes 
Waltz when explaining the impact of Waltz’ theory on the field.   
6  John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton, 2001), p. 3. 
7  Ibid., pp. 156-57.  
8  Ibid., p. 139. 
9  Ibid., p. 40. 
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2. Liberalism 
Realism centers around the idea that gaining or losing power is a zero-sum game.  
On the other hand, liberalism believes international affairs are non-zero-sum.  This family 
of theories argues every country can gain and improve its position without other countries 
sacrificing their own positions.   
A common facet throughout the liberal paradigm includes that of economic 
interdependence.  Many scholars who subscribe to liberalism argue economic 
interdependence and openness are a crucial link to decreasing military clashes between 
states.  Bruce Russett and John Oneal argue this is one leg in their Kantian triangle in 
their book, Triangulating Peace.10  They argue democracy, economic interdependence 
and international organizations all work hand-in-hand to increase peace throughout 
regions characterized by them.  Russett and Oneal write “there is strong, consistent 
evidence that economic interdependence…significantly reduces the risk that two states 
will become involved in a militarized dispute.”  Ultimately, they claim:  “countries that 
are interdependent bilaterally or economically open to the global economy, whether 
democratic or not, have an important basis for pacific relations and conflict resolution.”11 
3. Comparing the Paradigms 
Each international relations theory paradigm sheds light on this growing 
relationship between South Korea and China.  Realism offers contributions because some 
analysts believe China exhibits hegemonic intentions.  On the other hand, the intense 
economic ties between the two countries serve as the foundation of this overall 
relationship and, so far, have helped the two countries to overcome diplomatic disputes as 
liberalism would predict.  Analyzing each country’s actions through these two theoretical 
paradigms helps explain why each country has pursued its unlikely relationship. 
E. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter II offers an overview of the current relationship between South Korea and 
China.  It portrays the economic, diplomatic, military, cultural and social relationships 
and provides a summary of the growing pains the countries have experienced since 
                                                 
10 Bruce M. Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations, (New York: Norton, 2001). 
11  Ibid., p. 154-55.  
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normalization of relations in 1992.  China has become South Korea’s primary trading 
partner while South Korea ranks in the top five of China’s partners.  Diplomatically, the 
relations have flourished since normalization and today the two are major players in the 
Six-Party Talks aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis.  South Korean 
tourism and student exchanges to China have increased steadily, while the Chinese 
consumption of South Korean pop culture has soared.  In short, this chapter characterizes 
the relationship since 1992.  Subsequent chapters explore what drove the ROK and the 
PRC to pursue this relationship and assess the importance of the relationship to each 
country and to the neighbor saddled between them, North Korea.   
Chapter III focuses on South Korea and why it has pursued a relationship with 
China.  Explicitly taking a liberal paradigm approach, leaders in South Korea sought to 
engage China through economic interdependence as a way to reduce the threat on the 
peninsula and in the region.  Engaging China through then-President Kim Dae Jung’s 
Sunshine Policy opened the door into North Korea that led to the historic summit in 2000 
in which both Koreas took steps toward reconciliation.  Even prior to that, President Roh 
Tae Woo hoped to induce North Korea to open up by pursuing friendly relations with it 
and other communist bloc countries during the late 1980s and early 1990s.   
China’s reasons for pursuing a relationship with South Korea comprise Chapter 
IV.  Some argue Beijing is actively balancing against the United States as it rises to great 
power status in the world.  In particular, a number of realist scholars believe Beijing is 
using its relationship with South Korea to gain power in the region more broadly.  On the 
other hand, liberal theorists argue Beijing uses South Korea’s approach to economic 
development as a model draw on in implementing its own reforms.  This thesis contends, 
on the contrary, that several countries in Asia have pursued this economic model; 
therefore, South Korea’s development model should not be over-emphasized in terms of 
its importance to China.  Similarly, with so many countries of the region investing 
heavily in China, South Korea’s investments in the PRC fail to be the main driver for 
Beijing’s pursuit of a durable relationship.  Generally, Beijing’s actions regarding Korea 
indicate it is a stabilizing power seeking good neighborly relations with other countries in 
the region as the avenue to the peace and stability that are key to its own long-term 
development.  This thesis argues the Chinese have developed their own paradigm that 
8 
will be called here, Realpolitik with Chinese characteristics.  This chapter explains this 
new paradigm and how it accounts for China’s desire for a strong relationship with South 
Korea.    
Chapter V assesses North Korea’s views of these issues.  It first examines 
Pyongyang’s relationships with China and South Korea since the 1948 partition.  Then it 
evaluates Pyongyang’s views on the growing relationship between its two neighbors.  
Kim Jong Il does not appear as adamantly opposed to this relationship as one might 
expect.  Instead, he has mostly concealed his opinions.  Yet scholars believe Kim Jong Il 
knows he cannot stop this relationship from growing and has even taken small steps to 
capitalize on this situation.  Kim faces a dilemma because he wants to implement the 
socio-economic reforms Beijing and Seoul encourage, but doing so could cause diminish 
his stature amongst the North Korean people.  Finally, the chapter examines implications 
of this relationship for North Korea, most of which seem to point toward advantages for 
Kim Jong Il if he handles the situation deftly. 
In the concluding chapter, the possible implications of this relationship for the 
changing power structure in the region are assessed.  Specifically, the implications for 
Japan and the United States are considered.  Based on the historical animosities the 
Chinese and Koreans feel toward Japan, Tokyo risks being isolated from the region.  The 
dynamic relationship between South Korea and China could potentially serve as a 
balancing factor against Japan’s economic power in the region.  Similarly, as the United 
States faces rising anti-American sentiment in South Korea because of its policies toward 
the ROK-PRC ties, North Korean brinkmanship, and Japan’s willingness to assist the 
United States in dealing with Sino-Korean affairs, it stands to lose its influence in the 
region.  As more and more South Koreans look to China for friendship, as China stands 
to be the biggest source of influence if North Korea opens up, and as an alliance with 
Japan stands to alienate the United States even more, policymakers in the United States 
need to take notice of this growing relationship.  After highlighting these implications, 






II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINA AND SOUTH 
KOREA TODAY 
To better appreciate the importance and potential impact of China’s and South 
Korea’s relationship today, one should be familiar with their historical past.  Sino-Korean 
relations date back to the time Korea began emerging as a unified state in the sixth 
century A.D.  Some argue Korea had considered China greatly important since the fourth 
century B.C.12  Nonetheless, until the Chinese Qing dynasty, Korea held its closest 
relations with China.  Not only did Korea draw many cultural influences, such as 
language, Confucianism and Buddhism, but it also paid tribute to the Chinese court.13  
While some refer to this relationship as a suzerainty, “the Sino-Korean tributary system 
was one of inconsequential hierarchy and real independence, if not equality.”14  Koreans 
were interested in China “in the same way that Renaissance Europe was attracted to 
Greece as the citadel of civilization and culture in what was then the known world.”15  
However, the Chinese viewed Korea as a little brother, and were “so absolutely 
convinced of [their] own superiority” that they thought Korea would naturally follow 
China.   
This relationship worked well—a pleasant blend of cultural and military 
cooperation and independence—until the Manchus installed the Qing dynasty during the 
early seventeenth century.  Not only did the Koreans view the Manchus as barbaric, but 
the weakness the Qing dynasty, coupled with the rising strength of Japan, led to China’s 
relinquishing of Korea to Japan as a result of its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 
1894.16  From that point on, Korea practically lost all connection with China as Japan 
colonized it and other western powers began to compete for influence on the peninsula.  
This competition became violent with the onset of the Korean War in 1950.  Afterwards, 
                                                 
12 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (London: Warner Books, 1999), p.  3, 
230. 
13 Ibid., p.  230. 
14 Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement, 




three brutal years later, China maintained a largely influential relationship with North 
Korea but lost virtually all contact with the South.   
Nearly thirty years after fighting that gruesome and bloody war as adversaries, 
China and South Korea began developing a relationship that would astonish the rest of 
the world by the turn of the century.  Although Korean and Chinese leaders often refer to 
their nearly-2,000-year history when encouraging this current relationship to grow, it 
began purely as an economic opportunity while Beijing was implementing market 
reforms.  From the late 1970s until normalization in 1992, their economic relationship 
grew steadily—and quietly, in an effort to avoid upsetting North Korea—with 
transactions through Hong Kong.  Even today, the popular perceptions of each other stem 
from an economic viewpoint:  “the underlying force in the relationship remains a 
widespread perception of China as an irresistible business opportunity and of South 
Korea as an economic model and significant investor in economic growth.”17  After 
normalization of diplomatic relations and, especially, after China’s entry into the World 
Trade Organization, the relationship skyrocketed to new heights since Beijing had more 
room to maneuver without offending Pyongyang.  In fact, by 2002, China clearly 
possessed a stronger economic relationship with South Korea than with its counterpart to 
the North:  “the $38 billion China-South Korea relationship in 2002 outpaced the $728 
million worth of China-North Korea trade by a factor of 50.”18   
With this solid economic foundation, China and South Korea slowly began 
developing sound relations in other areas such as the diplomatic, military and cultural 
arenas.  While rocky at times, the importance of this rounded relationship has surfaced as 
China and South Korea increasingly work together to address regional affairs, 
particularly crises involving North Korea.  This chapter provides an overview assessing 
the current history of this relationship by looking at it economically, diplomatically and 
culturally.   
 
                                                 
17  Scott Snyder, "Clash, Crash, and Cash: Core Realities in the Sino-Korean Relationship," 
Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations 4, no. 2 (2002). 
18  Scott Snyder, "Regime Change and another Nuclear Crisis," Comparative Connections: An E-
Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations 4, no. 4 (2003). 
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A. ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP 
The economic relationship between the two countries serves as the foundation 
upon which the ROK and PRC have based the rest of their relationship.  No matter how 
troubled situations get, their trade continues at an unequivocal pace.  In 2002, Sino-ROK 
trade had increased seven times since 1992.19  From the beginning of their economic 
relationship, trade between the two had increased 1,647 times from 1979 to 2001; “it took 
30-some years for Korean-U.S. trade to accomplish a comparable level of expansion.”20  
Similarly, South Korean investment in China surpassed that of Japan’s in 2004 to make it 
China’s third largest investor.21  The figures below portray a statistical overview of the 
Sino-ROK economic relationship.  To fully understand how strong this economic 
relationship has become, after presenting Tables 1-8, this section will lay out the 
evolution of it, looking at relations before normalization, the Asian Financial Crisis, three 
lucrative trade sectors, a timeline of events in the new millennium, the effect of the 
World Trade Organization, the effect of foreign direct investment and, finally, the 
downsides of the economic relationship.   





















Figure 1.   ROK-PRC Trade, 1979—200422 
                                                 
19  Divided Attention:  International Relations, North and South Korea, [cited 2005].  Available from 
http://abcasiapacific.com/koreas/international/china.htm.  Accessed Oct 2005. 
20  Jae Ho Chung, "South Korea between Eagle and Dragon:  Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic 
Dilemma," Asian Survey, 2001, p. 781. 
21  "Trade with S. Korea on Fast Track," Xinhua English, 4 March 2005. 
22  "Manufacturer, Exporter, Importer, Market Survey - all about Korea Trade," in KITA [database 
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Figure 2.   ROK’s FDI into PRC, 1985-200423 
 



























Figure 3.   ROK’s Amount of Trade with Each Major Partner (Including PRC) Since 198124 
                                                 
23  Chang-kyu Lee, "Economic Relations between Korea and China," Korea Economic Institute’s 
Korea’s Economy, 2004, p. 71. 
24  IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. Yearbook.  I took the major trading partners of both China and 





















































Figure 5.   The FDI of Major Trading Partners into China from 1980-199726 
                                                 
25  IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. Yearbook.  I took the major trading partners of both China and 





























Figure 6.   The Outgoing FDI from ROK into Its Major Trading Partners, 1985-199727 
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Figure 7.   The Percentage of Trade with Each Country Out of Total Trade Since 198128 
                                                                                                                                                 
26  "Data and Statistics," in The World Bank Group [database online]. [cited 2005].  Available from 
http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization/data.html.  Accessed Oct 2005.  I used the same 
partners as above if they had data available. 
27  Ibid.  I used the same partners as above if they had data available. 
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Figure 8.   The Percentage of Outgoing FDI from ROK into PRC Out of Total ROK 
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Figure 9.   The Percentage of Exports to Each Country Out of Constant GDP, 1990-200430 
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30  “Manufacturer, Exporter, Importer, Market Survey - all about Korea Trade.”  And "Strategic Asia:  
A Program of the National Bureau of Asian Research," [cited 2005].  Available from 
http://strategicasia.nbr.org/Data/CView/View.aspx?c=34.  Accessed Oct 2005. 
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4. Pre-Normalization  
The seeds for this prospering economic relationship were planted in the late 1970s 
when Seoul sought to capitalize on China’s opening of its market.  Able to circumvent 
the political and security implications, the two countries began trading with “a 
willingness by both Seoul and Beijing to separate politics from economics [that] therefore 
allowed an incremental improvement in relations.”31  As the economic relationship began 
to grow, diplomatic ties inevitably emerged.  In 1990, the Korea Trade Promotion 
Association (KOTRA) and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce set up trade offices which 
“marked the start of government-sanctioned economic relations and the shift from 
indirect trade to open and direct transactions.”32  Progression continued over the next 
couple years as both governments granted each other Most Favored Nation status and 
agreed to protect investments.33  Finally, in 1992, China and South Korea normalized 
relations, forty years after a brutal, bloody war and just three years after the Berlin Wall 
fell, leading to German unification.   
5. Asian Financial Crisis 
The economic relationship between China and South Korea continued to grow 
rapidly after normalization.  The Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 gave Beijing an 
opportunity to show how much it valued its relationship with South Korea, which had 
been hit fairly hard by the crisis: Beijing promised not to devalue the yuan “in order not 
to destabilize the economic turmoil sweeping Asian countries.”34  China, itself, avoided 
being hurt directly by the crisis because, according to scholar Robert G. Sutter, “its 
currency was not convertible, it holds the world’s second largest reserve of foreign 
exchange, its large international debt mainly involves long-term commitments, and the 
vast majority of investment in China comes from the 40 percent domestic savings rate.”35 
Nonetheless, Beijing’s commitment helped South Korea to recover quickly, which in 
turn, helped the trade volume between the two countries rebound and continue growing 
                                                 
31  Cha, "Engaging China: Seoul-Beijing Détente and Korean Security," 73-99.    
32  Ibid. 
33  Ibid. 
34  "PRC Urges ROK to Refrain from Enacting Citizenship Law," Yonhap, 21 September 1998, FBIS, 
FTS19980921000494. 
35 Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Policy Priorities and their Implications for the United States, p. 6.   
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as can be seen in Figure 1.36  Victor Cha accurately encapsulates the situation when he 
wrote, “the impact of the financial crisis on the China-South Korea axis, therefore, has 
been neutral if not positive, attesting to the resilience of relations.”37  Not only did the 
economic relationship overcome turbulence that will be highlighted later in this chapter, 
but as Victor Cha stated, it grew stronger.   
6. Three Lucrative Trade Sectors 
Several sectors became highly lucrative to South Korean trade: construction, 
telecommunications, and manufacturing.  By 1999, China became the “largest market for 
Korean construction projects abroad,” and with $750 billion worth of infrastructure 
projects through the end of the millennium, the market only grew larger for Korean 
construction companies.38  As China began to develop code-division multiple access 
(CDMA)—technology that allows cellular phones to work—lines for its mobile 
telecommunications sector, South Korea maneuvered to gain a share of the market, 
spending “considerable time and effort lobbying Chinese [government] counterparts to 
support South Korean participation in China’s CDMA development at virtually every 
senior leadership meeting” from late 1998 until the first round of bidding in 2001.39  
Manufacturing comprises South Korea’s third focus in China.  This focus has made such 
an impact that Korean products are gaining recognition in China’s huge domestic market.  
In 2001, more than 20 percent of Chinese consumers “picked passenger cars as a product 
associated with Korea, with 16.7 percent and 11.8 percent choosing mobile phones and 
TV sets, respectively.”  Also, a principal manufacturer, the LG Group, “has established 
itself as a major provider of reasonably priced household goods” in China.40   
 
 
                                                 
36  Dae Yeol Son, "The Role of China in Korean Unification" (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2003), p. 61. 
37  Cha, "Engaging China: Seoul-Beijing Détente and Korean Security," p. 89. 
38  Ibid., p. 88. 
39  Scott Snyder, "Economic Interests Uber Alles:  Hitting the Jackpot through Sino-Korean 
Partnership," Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations 3, no. 2 (2001).  
And Sung-Jin Yang, "Korea Storms Chinas Handset Market," Asia Computer Weekly (Aug 19 2002): 1.  
40  Snyder, "Economic Interests Uber Alles:  Hitting the Jackpot through Sino-Korean Partnership.“  
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7. Growth in the New Millennium 
China and South Korea continued to improve this economic foundation during the 
first few years of the new millennium.  In 2001, Seoul created the “China Experts 
Forum” with its mission being “to develop long-term strategy [sic] to enhance trade and 
investment between the two countries.”41  In November, Korean small- and medium-size 
businesses were represented at the “Korea Product Show 2001” in Beijing.42  Drastic 
tariff rate reductions materialized on both sides in early 2002 when China joined the 
“Bangkok Agreement.”43  This agreement is a “preferential trade arrangement that aims 
at promoting intra-regional trade through exchange of mutually agreed concessions by 
member countries,” currently includes China, South Korea, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka 
and Laos,44 and is the largest PTA in the world in terms of population.45   A few months 
later, the finance ministers from both countries launched “The Korea-China Investment 
Cooperation Committee” in Seoul.46  Shortly thereafter, talks began about building an 
industrial complex for Korean manufacturers on the North Korea-China border.47  
Meanwhile, the Bank of Korea agreed to a currency swap worth $2 billion as a 
preventative measure for another Asian financial crisis.48  In early 2003, a “China 
Business School” opened in Korea with its purpose being to “educate Korean businesses 
about specialized topics regarding trade and investment with China.”49  South Korea’s 
                                                 
41  Scott Snyder, "Navigating the Swiftly Shifting Currents," Comparative Connections: An E-Journal 
on East Asian Bilateral Relations 3, no. 3 (2001).  And Yoon-bae Park, "Gov't to Hammer Out Measures to 
Cope with China's WTO Entry," Korea Times, 14 November 2001.  
42  Scott Snyder, "Keeping the Eye on the (WTO) Prize while Containing Consular Crises," 
Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations 3, no. 4 (2002). 
43  Scott Snyder, "Transit, Traffic Control, and Telecoms:  Crossing the ‘T’s’ in Sino-Korean 
Exchange," Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations 4, no. 1 (2002). 
44  "United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific," in UNESCAP 
[database online]. 14 October [cited 2005].  Available from http://www.unescap.org/index.asp. 
45  "China Joins Bangkok Agreement," Press Release, UN Press Release, REC/87, United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, New York.  
46  Snyder, "Clash, Crash, and Cash: Core Realities in the Sino-Korean Relationship.”  
47  Ibid. 
48  Ibid.  And "Seoul, Beijing Agree to Swap Foreign Currency in Case of Crisis," Korea Times, 5 
November 2001. 
49  Snyder, "Regime Change and another Nuclear Crisis.”   
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evasion of a recession in the latter half of 2004, primarily because of its exports to China, 
also helped to solidify this economic relationship.50   
8. China’s Entry into the World Trade Organization 
While three sectors mentioned earlier have constituted the primary focus, other 
events have improved the economic relationship, particularly China’s entry into the 
World Trade Organization in late 2001.  China’s membership in the WTO “[boosted] the 
ROK-PRC trade and investment volume and [enhanced] much more mutual economic 
interdependence” between the two countries.51  Less than one year after China’s entry 
into the WTO, trade volume between the two countries increased so much that China 
became South Korea’s number one trading partner, surpassing the United States.  Korea 
also invested more in China ($1.3 billion52) than in the United States in 2002.53   
9. Foreign Direct Investment 
While most FDI is comprised of only money (for FDI statistics, see Figures 2, 5, 6 
and 8), South Korea’s includes more than that.  In 2000, “a Korea-China job training 
center [opened] in Beijing, financed by the Korea International Cooperation Agency 
(KOICA), as part of efforts to support human resources development in China.”54  While 
China constitutes the world’s “leading destination for foreign direct investment,” Korean 
small- and medium-size enterprises, surprisingly, “are leading the Korean FDI charge in 
China” rather than the major corporations that run bigger operations.55  In fact, the Korea 
Small and Medium Business Institute surveyed 178 enterprises in 2003, 72.2 percent of 
whom replied they “hope to invest in China within five years.”56  While trade and 
investments have greatly increased over the years and have substantially strengthened the 
                                                 
50  Scott Snyder, "Waiting Game," Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral 
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56  Snyder, "Regime Change and another Nuclear Crisis.”  
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economic relationship between South Korea and China, other events have also 
contributed to, or were a result of, this strengthened relationship. 
10. Downsides 
Of course, this relationship has its drawbacks.  As China continues to grow and 
modernize, the relationship will see some competition.  China’s product improvement has 
“increasingly challenged” Korea’s competitiveness in underdeveloped countries.  Not 
only that, but as China’s products improve, Chinese demand for South Korean products 
will decline.57  At the same time, Korean firms are facing competition with China’s low 
labor costs, the result of which has “[hollowed] out Korean industry and [has created] 
unprecedented levels of investment by Korean firms in plants based in China.”  Yet as 
these fears gain more attention, alleviations emerge as well, such as industrial zones that 
intend to use low wage North Korean labor.58 
11. Optimistic Future 
The economic relationship between South Korea and China, nonetheless, remains 
strong with many optimistic about its future.  In fact, conglomerates feel comfortable 
enough about the future that many are looking to incorporate strategies that view China 
as a “second internal market.”59  Perhaps South Koreans feel comfortable because they 
feel they recognize China’s situation, as best stated by Scott Snyder: 
The bustling feel and particular needs of the PRC as a late-developing 
modernizer, the role of the state in order, brokering, and channeling 
economic opportunities, the lack of regulatory infrastructure, and the risks 
(corruption) and opportunities (entrepreneurship) that such an atmosphere 
provides, the combination of constraint on political expression and 
economic opportunism that permeates Chinese society—all these aspects 
of the business atmosphere in China are immediately recognizable to 
                                                 
57  "ROK’s Yonhap: Exports have been Remarkable, but can S. Korea Sustain Momentum?" Yonhap, 
October 21 2004, FBIS, KPP20041021000040. 
58  Snyder, "Waiting Game;” And, B. J. Lee, "An Oasis of Capitalism; South Korean Companies 
Explore the Possibilities of Outsourcing to the North, in a New Economic Zone." Newsweek (Sep 19 2005): 
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Times are Ahead," Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations 4, no. 3 
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South Korean entrepreneurs, who almost instinctively understand how to 
work in an environment reminiscent of South Korea two decades ago.60 
No matter what causes this relationship to grow or slow, it serves as a foundation from 
which other relations between South Korea and China have expanded and will continue 
to expand. 
B. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP 
Since normalization, Beijing and Seoul have pursued variations of what they call 
a “cooperative partnership.”61  On top of economic cooperation, Beijing and Seoul 
conduct active diplomatic exchanges, pursue military exchanges, and work together 
toward peace on the peninsula.  Of particular interest is the cooperation between the two 
countries regarding the Six Party Talks.  Their efforts to engage North Korea during the 
present nuclear crisis exemplifies how their economic relationship has strengthened their 
diplomatic one: 
Burgeoning bilateral trade and investment anchors the China-South Korea 
economic relationship and underscores mutual interests in a diplomatic 
approach to North Korea that peacefully bounds North Korean nuclear 
threats and introduces gradual economic reforms to the North.62 
Even so, the diplomatic relationship has developed more slowly than the economic one; 
yet it still has progressed substantially since normalization.   
The opening of the South Korean consulate in Shenyang province, located in 
northeastern China, depicts a good example of substantial yet slow progress.  The 
Chinese embassy and a consulate are open in Seoul and Pusan, respectively, while South 
Korea has an embassy in Beijing and five consulates throughout China.63  However, the 
                                                 
60  Scott Snyder, "Happy Tenth for PRC-ROK Relations!  Celebrate while You can, because Tough 
Times are Ahead," Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations 4, no. 3 
(2002). 
61 Mentionings of this “cooperative partnership” can be found throughout the recent years in several 
publications, to include:  Cha, "Engaging China: Seoul-Beijing Détente and Korean Security," 73-99.  
Snyder, "Consummating ‘Full-Scale Cooperative Partnership.”  And Snyder, "Economic Interests Uber 
Alles:  Hitting the Jackpot through Sino-Korean Partnership.”  
62  Snyder, "Regime Change and another Nuclear Crisis.” 
63  "KR.EmbassyInformation.Com - South Korea Embassy Information," in Korean Overseas 
Information Service [database online]. South Korea [cited 2005].  Available from 
http://www.kr.embassyinformation.com.  Accessed Oct 2005. 
22 
consulate in Shenyang province did not open until 1999, after seven years of 
negotiations.  The South Koreans desired a consulate there due to the one million 
Korean-Chinese and 5,000-10,000 South Koreans who reside there.64  Chinese officials 
cited concerns that “Seoul would create an extraordinary alliance with the three 
northeastern Chinese provinces and that North Korea, which already operates a consulate 
general in Shenyang, might react negatively to the decision.”65  Thus, seven years of 
negotiations eventually garnered a consulate affairs office for South Korea; the office was 
upgraded to consulate general level in 2002.66  Nonetheless, Beijing and Seoul have 
pursued a diplomatic relationship beyond the concerns of North Korea.   
In 2000, Beijing and Seoul agreed to install direct hotlines between the two 
foreign ministers.67  That same year, the two governments signed a treaty on “judicial 
cooperation in criminal investigations,” which allowed for “information and evidence 
exchange between law enforcement authorities.”68  Then in 2001, an ROK consulate-
general in Guangzhou opened a “to assist Korean companies operating in the region and 
help arrange personnel exchanges.”69  Along with their growing diplomatic relationship, 
the South Korean government has taken steps to show China how much it values this 
relationship. 
One particular display consists of Seoul’s “one China” policy.  Aside from 
discontinuing flights to Taipei after normalization, Seoul has taken other steps to show 
China where it stands.  In 2002, the government opposed a visit to the country by 
Taiwan’s First Lady Wu Shu-chen, citing it would violate the “one China” policy.70  
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Seoul also prevented a visit to South Korea by the Dalai Lama against the protest of 
many Buddhist groups in South Korea.  More recently, Seoul told the United States it 
could not use U.S. troops stationed in South Korea for operations outside the Korean 
peninsula without Seoul’s consent.  This action was seen as an attempt to deconflict 
interests should a military dispute break out between China and Taiwan.71   
1. Military Relationship 
Perhaps, in order to diffuse concerns that the U.S.-ROK alliance aims to contain 
China, Seoul has developed a military relationship alongside its diplomatic one with 
Beijing.  In 1999, Beijing and Seoul institutionalized “reciprocal annual visits by their 
defense ministers.”72  Considering the two countries were brutal adversaries fifty years 
earlier, the visit by Chinese Defense Minister, Chi Haotian, to South Korea in early 2000 
made history.  His visit, constituting the first official visit to Seoul by a person in his 
position since the Korean War, also signified the growth of this relationship as he “was 
the first major guest of the new millennium in Seoul.”73  Seoul reciprocated the visit a 
year later when the Army Chief of Staff, Kil Hyoung-bo, visited China, the first ROK 
Army chief to do so since the end of the Korean War.74  Meanwhile, the two countries 
increased its military exchanges when eighteen Chinese students from the PRC National 
Defense College visited the Korea National Defense University for ten days in the 
summer of 2000.75  Another significant military event occurred in late 2001 when a few 
ships from South Korea’s Navy made its first port call to the mainland in Shanghai.76  
Also, in 2003, Seoul and Beijing “agreed to hold [bilateral] security talks on a regular 
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basis.”77  Finally, after a four day visit to China in late March/early April of 2005, South 
Korea’s Defense Minister, Yoon Kwang-ung, said Seoul would expand military 
exchanges with China, increasing them to the level between South Korea and Japan.78  
China displayed its appreciation for South Korea’s efforts in all areas of the 
strengthening relationship when the PRC media rendered “highly positive treatment” 
toward South Korea’s President Roh Moo-hyun during his visit in 2003; it was deemed 
the “most positive coverage…in recent years.”  Some believe the treatment reflected 
China’s “continuing efforts to strengthen political as well as economic ties.”79  South 
Korea’s strides could be seen as well when, in 2000, then-President Kim Dae-Jung asked 
Beijing to take on a “leading role in efforts to find a peace formula to replace the 
armistice” from the Korean War, a tremendous step for the adversaries of that war.80  
That Kim Dae-Jung asked for help is irrelevant; that he asked Beijing, of all 
governments, signifies the growing strength of their diplomatic relationship. 
While the two governments have encouraged a closer relationship, the citizens of 
each country have followed in their governments’ footsteps or, even, paved the way 
through social and cultural ties.  Although China and Korea share a deep history more 
than two thousand years old, memories of the living generations know only of the deep 
adversarial agitations from 1950 through 1992.  While the older generations in South 
Korea still favor the United States, most of the people in both China and South Korea 
seem to feel the same way as the governments do.  This sentiment is no more apparent 
than in the social and cultural ties developing as each country experiences a “fever” for 
the other one. 
C. CULTURAL/SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP 
A significant indicator of the strengthening relationship between China and South 
Korea is the boisterous cultural and social ties growing in each country.  Tourism, student 
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exchanges, and demand for pop culture have all skyrocketed in recent years.  South 
Korea’s co-hosting of the 2002 World Cup could serve as the pinnacle of cultural ties 
between the two countries since as many as 30,000 Chinese descended upon South Korea 
during one summer month.81  This section looks at events and trends in each country that 
constitute these cultural and social ties. 
1. South Korea 
Virtually everyone is aware of the “China fever” currently spreading throughout 
South Korea.  While some Koreans look to China for its economic opportunities, others 
are attracted to China’s history and possible growing power.  Thus, many South Koreans 
have begun to pursue interests involving China. 
The increase in tourism to China from South Korea provides substantial evidence 
of this “China fever.”  In 2001, a new high of 1.6 million South Koreans visited 
China82—the number of South Korean visitors to Japan would not reach that level until 
2004.83  Perhaps as a result, Korean Airlines announced “expanded flight service” to 12 
cities in China on 16 different routes 82 times a week in 2002.  The company expected 
more than 1 million passengers (a new high) for the year.84  To credit KAL’s 
anticipation, by April 2002, “the number of flights between South Korea and China 
surpassed the number of flights between South Korea and Japan for the first time.”85  
Even with half the World Cup games occurring in Japan, more Koreans flew to China 
than Japan that summer.86  Moreover, the numbers continue to rise.  In 2005, China was 
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South Korea’s top destination spot when nearly 3 million South Koreans—28.7% of the 
10.3 million South Koreans who traveled abroad that year—headed that way.87 
Meanwhile, student exchanges have increased as well.  While the increase may 
also reflect the more stringent visa requirements for entering the United States after Sept. 
11, 2001, the fact that South Koreans are choosing China still reflects the growing social 
ties.   At the top Chinese universities, South Korean students “[constitute] well over half 
of foreign enrollment.”88  At the same time, the two governments have conducted student 
exchanges at a “municipal governmental level.”89  On a reciprocal note, Seoul National 
University formed, in 2000, the “East Asian Academic Network” that included joint 
degrees and exchanges with Beijing and Tokyo Universities.90   
The South Korean government has also taken steps to increase cultural ties.  
China became so popular in South Korea that Seoul announced plans in 2005 to develop 
a “large-scale Chinatown” in Ilsan, northwest of Seoul.”91  Also, the Ministry of Culture 
and Tourism developed a plan to help “export Korean pop culture to China.”92    
2. China 
The Chinese seem to have fallen in love with Korean pop culture.  As China 
begins to open up, infatuation with South Korea’s pop culture seems to make sense 
merely due to the lack of its own.  Or possibly it is more than that.  Perhaps, similar to 
American pop culture throughout the world, Chinese are simply interested in Korean pop 
culture.  Either way, South Korean television shows, movies and music are storming their 
way into China.  Even so, the Chinese have pursued more than just pop culture to 
increase their cultural and social ties with South Koreans; tourism in China has increased 
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and Beijing has opened a cultural center and school in South Korea.  Some scholars have 
begun to call this phenomenon the “Korean wave” as it “marks South Korea’s capacity to 
make a notable contribution to China’s consumer culture and South Korea remains a 
model—and benchmark—for managing China’s own economic development and 
political liberalization process.”93   
South Korean television, movies, computer games and music have all gained 
tremendous popularity recently throughout China.  In fact, South Korean soap operas 
maintain a “huge influence” over Chinese viewers, even during low viewing hours such 
as after 10 p.m.94  Pop music bands have made record-breaking sales, partly because “the 
developing Chinese market is so much bigger than the Korean domestic pop music 
sector,” while other groups have performed to sold-out crowds in China.  Some Chinese, 
particularly “young, upwardly-mobile Chinese girls,” even take “package tours” to South 
Korea to go to concerts and meet the stars.95 
South Korean companies in China have begun to capitalize on this “Korean 
wave,” using Korean television stars to advertise their products, to “expand the image of 
ROK products in China,” sponsoring concert tours, and “building promotions around the 
positive image of South Korean pop stars and pop culture.”96  Even Chinese companies 
have started recruiting Korean celebrities to market their products.97  At the same time, 
demand for South Korean products has increased.  In fact, Korea’s E-Mart, a discount 
store similar in style to Wal-Mart, already has three stores in Shanghai with plans to open 
its first supercenter in October 2005.  Interestingly, China was the first country to which 
the Korean company expanded.98   
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The “Korean wave” flowing through China became clearly evident during the 
2002 World Cup, co-hosted by South Korea.  The Chinese formed one of the largest 
groups to come to Korea during the tournament that summer.99  Even before the first-ever 
World Cup in Asia, tourism in South Korea from China increased by more than 20 
percent in 2001, increasing the “person-to-person exchange” between the two countries to 
approximately 2 million people per year.100 
The Chinese government has responded to this increased craze with South Korea 
by opening a cultural center in Seoul, the first in Asia, in December 2004.101  In the 
previous month, Beijing opened the “Confucius Institute” in Seoul, the “first overseas 
PRC government-sponsored Chinese language school.”102  At the same time, Beijing also 
hosted a delegation of youth assembly members from South Korea in January 2005.  
Wang Zhaoguo, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress (NPC), told the Xinhua News Agency that Beijing hosted the delegation 
because “to enhance multi-form and multi-level exchanges between young people is of 
significance for deepening mutual understanding and friendship between them and for 
promoting the friendly and cooperative relationship between the two countries.”103   
China clearly has a lot to gain from a strong relationship with South Korea in all 
areas.  So does South Korea from a relationship with China.  While the two countries 
have experienced turbulence along the way, they both seem to look toward a strong 
relationship for the foreseeable future.   
D. GROWING PAINS 
The apparently strong relationship is certainly not perfect.  Diplomatic concerns, 
ranging from environmental issues to trade disputes, have risen on occasion.  So far, 
Beijing and Seoul have managed to resolve these issues for the most part.  Though the 
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economic relationship has continued to grow as the two countries have worked through 
these state affairs, the occasional disputes deserve a review.  Major issues include trade 
disputes, maritime issues, illegal immigration, North Korean refugees fleeing to China, 
environmental concerns, and territorial issues.  They roughly fit into two categories: 
disputes as a result of the growth and disputes that can now be confronted and resolved in 
new ways as a result of normalization and growth.   
1. Disputes as a Result of Growth 
Garlic dumping—An example of a major trade dispute between the two countries 
pertains to the garlic dispute in 2000.  In just one year, China’s market share of garlic in 
South Korea had increased ten fold.  Seoul leveraged a 315% punitive tariff on garlic 
imports in response.  Unwilling to back down, Beijing, in return, banned imports of 
polyethylene and mobile phone equipment, two sectors that “[dwarfed] the size of the 
garlic trade,” causing almost $100 million in losses to the Korean companies involved.  
The dispute took only six weeks to resolve, although South Korea lost more on the deal 
than did China.104   
Maritime issues—Seoul has complained at times when South Korean fishermen 
feel Chinese fishermen, by virtue of location, have depleted fishing stocks in the waters 
near South Korea.  The two countries concluded a fisheries treaty in 1998, and while 
complaints have resurfaced from time to time, their relationship continues to grow.105  
Additionally, a scandal arose in 2000 in which seafood imports from China supposedly 
contained lead pellets in crabs and blowfish designed to increase the price by weight of 
the shipments.  This incident was one of a few “scams” that threatened public health in 
South Korea, raising concerns amongst Koreans about the “increasing dependency on 
Chinese food imports.”106   
Illegal immigration—Most of South Korea’s illegal immigrants are ethnic 
Koreans from China who face harsh working conditions.  As Korean lawmakers tried to 
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deal with these growing unemployment difficulties, they faced opposition from Beijing 
because their laws were either discriminatory or focused too much on ethnicity.107  The 
Chinese government refuses to allow its citizens to hold dual citizenships as it fears home 
countries of the minorities may try to gain territory in China.   
2. Confrontations and Resolutions as a Result of Normalization and 
Growth 
North Korean refugees—With numbers ranging from 10,000 to 300,000 North 
Koreans in Northeastern China, dealing with the refugees creates a precarious situation 
for both China and South Korea.  Beijing does not want to alienate Pyongyang by helping 
citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea escape to South Korea and claims 
they are not refugees as the UN claims, but illegal immigrants who should be sent back to 
North Korea.  Meanwhile South Korea does not turn any North Koreans away.  In some 
instances, Beijing has created an uproar in South Korea by storming its compounds in 
China to retrieve North Korean refugees.  But for the most part, Beijing seems overlook 
the North Koreans within its borders.  Only when a case becomes high profile, garnering 
media attention from around the world, does Beijing actively pursue North Koreans to 
return to the DPRK.  South Korea seems to accept this implicit deal as special groups 
continue to aid North Korean refugees and, though they complain during the high profile 
cases, seem to let it go quickly.108   
Yellow dust—Korea has been dealing with “yellow dust” from China since 174 
A.D.  Every spring, winds blow dust from the Gobi Desert that create a yellow haze 
throughout parts of Korea.  Due to drought in recent years and the increasing 
industrialization in the coastal cities of China, the dust has started to collect harmful 
particles, pollutants and heavy metals.  These particles can cause respiratory and skin 
problems.109  The governments of China, Mongolia, Japan and both Koreas have come 
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together to find ways to alleviate the environmental and health risks the “yellow dust” 
poses as the sandstorm occurrences increase every year.110      
Territorial disputes—A territorial dispute erupted recently between the two 
countries.  Based in a region that is now partially in northeastern China, Korguryo, 
founded in 37 B.C., is considered by Koreans as one of the three kingdoms of ancient 
Korea.  In 2004, Chinese scholars claimed the area was a vassal state of China, a claim 
that threatened to “seriously damage relations between the two countries.”111  Since 
many ethnically Korean Chinese  citizens reside there now (see Table 1 below), Beijing 
fears Koreans may try to reclaim the territory after unification.  Koreans were upset by 
the scholars’ claim because from their viewpoint, Korea was never a vassal state.  Korean 
kings only “rendered obeisance” to China because it “signified their cultural respect for 
China as the center of…the civilized world.”  Koreans considered this obeisance 
acceptable because Chinese leaders “carefully refrained from interfering with Korean 
political autonomy.”112  Like most other events, the dispute quieted as officials from the 
two countries worked to continue improving relations. 
Country (Region)                         Overseas Population                                    Percentage 
Africa                                                 7,900                                                 0.1
Australia                                                   84,316                                                          1.3
Canada                                                    198,170                                                          3.0
China                                                   2,439,395                                                        36.7
Europe                                                    107,579                                                          1.6
Russia                                                     532,697                                                          8.0
Japan                                                       901,282                                                        13.6 
Latin America                                         107,162                                                          1.6
Middle East                                                6,923                                                         0.1
New Zealand                                             31,800                                                         0.5
United States                                        2,087,496                                                       31.4 
Table 1. Distribution of Overseas Koreans in 2005113 
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No relationship is easy, including the one between China and South Korea.  While 
the strength of it is remarkable considering they were bitter enemies 50 years ago, it does 
have its problems.  At this point, they seem to quell disputes rather quickly.  However, 
some disputes seem to be quelled only for the moment.  As the growth of the relationship 
continues to gain momentum, the disputes may increase in number and in size, 
potentially derailing the relationship.  Nonetheless, at this point, the relationship 




























III. WHY SOUTH KOREA WANTS A STRONGER 
RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA 
Analyzing South Korea’s desire for a stronger relationship with China through 
terms defined in the International Relations field gives a better picture as to why its 
government and, generally, its business enterprises and people want a closer relationship 
with a country that served as their bitter enemy fifty years ago and that they had little 
contact with until the late 1980s.  This desire is especially surprising when considering 
Beijing’s “outright rejection of expressing remorse or repentance for the Korean War” in 
the normalization treaty.114  In Realist terms, will South Korea gain national security or 
regional hegemony by partnering with China?  In Liberalist terms, will South Korea gain 
domestic stability and peace through economic trade and interdependence by engaging 
China?  Having a strong relationship with its longtime neighbor seems beneficial in all 
aspects of South Korea’s current state of affairs.  Not only does China’s growing 
economy offer a myriad of opportunities for South Korean entrepreneurs, but China’s 
close relationship with North Korea offers an avenue for South Korea to reduce tensions 
on the peninsula.  Scholar Edward A. Olsen provides insight into these benefits: 
[In the late 1990s] Seoul was no longer simply doing an end run around 
Pyongyang; it was intensely engaging with China on a broad spectrum of 
activities for sound bilateral reasons and to make better use of China’s 
ability to help generate confidence-building measures between the two 
Koreas.  This alternative also was open to the United States and Japan, but 
neither possessed the reservoir of cultural, political, and strategic assets 
that China did.115 
This chapter argues the South Korean government has determined to achieve a strong 
relationship through economic engagement, a Liberalist view.  But first, this chapter 
considers the Realist approach and its flaws.                  
A. NATIONAL SECURITY AND REGIONAL HEGEMONY THROUGH 
REALISM 
A Realist might argue the South Korean government desires power.  It desires 
power, first, because all states do; South Korea’s economic strength, or “latent power,” 
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should be leading to a transformation toward real, or military, power.116  Secondly, South 
Korea has a real security threat it must contend with, North Korea.  With these two 
conditions in mind, a Realist should argue Seoul desires a strong relationship with 
Beijing because it sees Beijing as a source for the power it desires and needs, and 
therefore, is bandwagoning.  This section will portray a Realist argument explaining 
Seoul’s desires for a strong relationship with China and then the weakness of that 
argument. 
1. Regional Hegemony 
South Korea, one of the Asian “tigers,” has demonstrated incredible economic 
growth from the 1960s and is currently ranked as the fourteenth largest economy in the 
world.117  In theory, the government should be looking to transform this economic power 
into real, military power.  As China and the United States/Japan hold the most power in 
the region but are not exactly antagonistic, South Korean leaders should be building up 
the military and preparing—for when they do become antagonistic—to balance against 
one and bandwagon with the other.118  Seoul’s options are limited to balancing or 
bandwagoning since it lacks the strength to challenge either power directly.  
Though already holding a strong alliance with the United States, South Korea 
appears to be bandwagoning with China as its leaders anticipate China’s rise to a regional 
hegemonic status, potentially returning Northeast Asian order to its pre-Western intrusion 
structure.  Kenneth Waltz perhaps defines it best when he said, “in a competition for the 
position of leader, bandwagoning is sensible behavior where gains are possible even for 
the losers and where losing does not place their security in jeopardy.”119  Seoul certainly 
gains significantly by joining China.  In fact, it actually gains more security, per se, by 
this form of losing because Beijing helps to reduce tensions with North Korea. 
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Thus Seoul, according to Realism, has pursued a relationship with China in order 
to enjoy China’s impending success.  At the same time, Seoul seems to not only have 
jumped on the bandwagon, but is helping push China’s rise to power as well.  Scholar 
Lee Chae-Jin states Roh Jae Won, the head of the KOTRA [Korea Trade Promotion 
Corporation] representative office in Beijing in 1992, told him in an interview that same 
year that in convincing Beijing to normalize, South Korean diplomats played up China’s 
role as a leader in Asia: 
…in normalizing its diplomatic relations with South Korea, China would 
assert a bona fide role of leadership in Asia and recognize Beijing-Seoul 
relations for their intrinsic merits, rather than as an extension of inter-
Korean relations and North Korea’s relations with the United States and 
Japan.120 
How willingly Seoul sacrifices its own interests in exchange for support from 
China signifies another example of bandwagoning.  A Realist declares the weaker power 
sacrifices more for the great power in exchange for more security benefits.  The only 
country in Asia with strong ties to Taiwan remaining, the South Korean government cut 
the ties abruptly as part of its normalization treaty with the People’s Republic of China in 
1992.  Direct flights between Taiwan and Korea were permanently cancelled—although 
they have since been re-established—and Seoul demanded Taiwan officials “promptly 
vacate” the $1.7 billion embassy complex, which was then given to the PRC for use.121  
And, despite strong requests from South Korea’s Buddhist community, Seoul rejected a 
visit by the Dalai Lama.122  Seoul’s focus on gaining cooperation and support from 
Beijing, even though Beijing does not reciprocate all the time—examples include 
Beijing’s returning of North Korean refugees to North Korea and claiming the Korguryo 
territory as a vassal state—has bolstered the relationship since normalization in 1992.123  
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Because Asia has historically known China as a regional hegemon and Asia has 
been most stable when China is strong, Seoul jumping on the bandwagon is fitting.  
David Kang argues this idea when he points out that from a Realist perspective, Korea 
should be one of the countries most fearful of China’s rise “because China can actually 
invade” it.  Yet, Korea is not “behaving in explicitly balancing behavior.”124  South 
Korea’s leaders desire to bandwagon with Beijing not just for the perks of regional 
hegemonic power or for a return to the hierarchical structure, but also to reduce the threat 
emanating from North Korea.   
2. National Security 
South Korea’s national security predicament certainly carries unique qualities that 
most countries do not experience today:  the Demilitarized Zone remains one of the most 
hostile areas in the world.  To reduce the tension on the peninsula, a Realist would expect 
Seoul to eliminate Pyongyang’s power by gaining its own.  Thus, Seoul pursued the 
foundation of North Korea’s power, China and the Soviet Union/Russia.  Befriending 
North Korea’s main ally was supposed to eliminate Beijing’s support for North Korea in 
exchange for support for the South.   
Rather than completely transfer total support from North Korea to South Korea, 
however, China transferred some, developing an equidistant “two-Korea” policy.  In 
doing so, Beijing has become an honest broker, exactly what Seoul needs to engage its 
brother to the north: 
China’s equidistant policy has been beneficial to South Korea in its efforts 
to dismantle the Cold War structure through its diversified bilateralism, 
not only because China can play a role of effective broker between Seoul 
and Pyongyang, but also because it can facilitate opening and reform of 
North Korea.125    
Beijing has urged both Koreas not to “threaten peace and stability.”  More specifically, in 
1999, Beijing used its influence to encourage Pyongyang “not to take actions that would 
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undermine regional stability.”  In fact, Chinese diplomats played “a critical role” in 
convincing Kim Jong Il not to conduct additional missile testing over Japan.126 
3. The Realism Argument Fails 
Whether China’s leaders want it or not, China’s rise in power is changing the 
hierarchical status within the Northeast Asian (and perhaps all of East Asian) region.  
Whatever the “re-ordering of regional ties” may be, the relationship between Seoul and 
Beijing certainly stands to play a critical role.127  Some people equate the “recent, relative 
peace” in Northeast Asia to China’s rise as a “responsible regional power.”128  Samuel 
Kim highlights this argument by summarizing Samuel Huntington’s claim, “Asia’s Sino-
centric past, not Europe’s multipolar past, ‘will be Asia’s future,’” hence the other 
countries in the region will bandwagon rather than balance against China.129  
However, this supposed bandwagoning does not fit Asia’s situation in the 
traditional Western sense.  South Korea’s—and the rest of Asia’s—developing 
relationship with China does not constitute bandwagoning, but rather, a  return to Asia’s 
pre-modern political structure, as Huntington pointed out.  In fact, many South Koreans 
do not see China as a threatening great power that needs to be balanced against or 
bandwagoned with.  As relations have warmed over the years, South Koreans have begun 
to perceive China as a “status quo power” no longer seeking unification, but stability.130  
If South Koreans do not view China as a threat but as the traditional leader—who has 
respected South Korea’s autonomy—it has historically been, the idea of bandwagoning 
with a regional hegemon does not apply.   
Further, South Korean leaders did not, as a Realist would presume, pursue China 
in an attempt to reduce North Korea’s power.  Instead, South Korean leaders explicitly 
expressed that they had no desire to contain or absorb North Korea but that they wanted 
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to engage it instead.  The South Korean government thought engaging China would 
provide the avenue into engaging North Korea. 
In 1990, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo announced he would follow up on 
his campaign promise to make China his “highest-priority target”131 of the nordpolitik 
policy, an engagement policy “that called for the improvement of South Korea’s relations 
with socialist powers according to principles of equality, respect, and mutual 
prosperity:132  
The ultimate objective of our northern policy is to induce North Korea to 
open up and thus to secure stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula.  
The road between Seoul and Pyongyang is now totally blocked.  
Accordingly, we have to choose an alternative route to the North Korean 
capital by way of Moscow and Beijing.  This may not be the most direct 
route, but we certainly hope it will be an effective one.133 
Moscow’s inability to support Pyongyang after the Soviet Union’s fall drove Seoul 
further into Beijing’s arms.  At the same time, “South Korean engagement [sought] to 
cultivate Beijing’s cooperation by tying Chinese national interests to stability on the 
Peninsula” through building multi-faceted exchanges.134  Over time, Beijing began to 
more actively ensure peace on the peninsula. 
 A good relationship with Beijing helped to reduce tensions emanating from North 
Korea without giving Pyongyang the impression it was cornered or contained:  
“engagement was successful…because it effectively isolated the North by befriending its 
two primary patrons” (China and Russia).135  The South Korean government made it 
abundantly clear containment was not its goal when the Foreign Minister at the time, Lee 
Joung-binn, encouraged Beijing to “convey to North Korea the true intentions behind 
[their] engagement policy.”  Moreover, another South Korean official publicly stated 
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Beijing, as a friend of Pyongyang, would be much more crucial than Washington, the 
antithesis to North Korea, in the reunification efforts.136      
 Ultimately, South Korean leaders are “immensely pleased with the outcome” of 
their engagement policy with China.137  Beijing has increasingly stepped up its role in 
facilitating peace and stability on the peninsula, the most visible being its role as host of 
the Six Party Talks.  Chinese leaders have also placed more pressure on Kim Jong Il to 
open up North Korea, who has responded by implementing some reforms he learned from 
China, allowing his country to experience economic growth, though minor, the past 
couple years.  Beijing also certainly influenced the two Koreas coming together for the 
2000 summit.138  As shown, Seoul clearly rebuked the Realist paradigm’s approach to 
inter-state affairs and explicitly chose the Liberalist approach.  Therefore looking at the 
Liberal paradigm will better explain why South Korea desires a strong relationship with 
China.   
B. INTERDEPENDENCE AND MULTILATERALISM THROUGH 
LIBERALISM 
The introductory chapter discussed the theory of Liberalism explained by Bruce 
Russett and John Oneal.  They argue democracy, interdependence and international 
organizations must work together in order to achieve peace.  With China specifically, 
Seoul has explicitly pursued two elements of the Kantian system, interdependence and 
international organizations.  Looking at the actions taken by South Korean leaders 
through these ideas delineates a clear picture as to why they desire a strong relationship 
with Beijing.   
1. Interdependence 
Engaging China through economic relations reduced tensions between the two 
states and, consequently, between the two Koreas.  As noted in Chapter II, the economic 
relationship serves as the foundation for other facets of their relationship.  At the same 
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time, their economies are complementary, creating an ardent desire in South Koreans to 
pursue economic opportunities in China.   
Victor Cha, generally considered a theoretical Realist, even highlighted Seoul’s 
belief “that economic linkages, investment, and trade ties can raise the benefits of 
cooperation and the costs of non-cooperation to China.”139  But he also acknowledges 
South Koreans do not naively believe this economic relationship solves the conflicts in 
Asia, but believe economics “lay the groundwork for, and [open] the door to, incremental 
cooperation.”140  Thus, this Liberal paradigm holds particular significance because it 
explains the foundation, the bedrock, of their entire relationship.  Cha appropriately calls 
it a “thick web of economic ties” that serves as the “mainstay for engagement.”141  Trade 
continues to flourish and grow each year, trade disputes are solved rather quickly, and 
political disputes barely seem to affect trade.  The economic stakes are too valuable for 
South Korea to let anything hurt this economic relationship.142  Many scholars concede 
that the “growing economic regionalization and interdependence have often served as a 
bulwark against persistent or periodic political tensions in…Sino-South Korean 
relations.”143   
Indeed, South Korean leaders use this economic relationship to further regional 
security, including “regional economic development and integration.”  The current South 
Korean President, Roh Moo-hyun, believes regional economics can serve “as a 
foundation and buffer through which political/security conflicts may be avoided,” and 
that “such economic interactions are an investment in good neighborly relations.”144  
Therefore, not only does China provide ample economic opportunity for South Korean 
businesses, it also allows Seoul to pursue security through intraregional economic 
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development.  Furthermore, should a free trade agreement amongst the three countries 
evolve from the economic interdependence developing in Asia, South Korea stands to 
achieve the most gross domestic product growth and economic gain (see table below).145  
Nonetheless, many South Koreans believe economic interdependence will facilitate more 
security and stability in the region. 
Korea-China-
Japan FTA 









Korea 3.2 12,644.5 2.4 10,687.8 1.1 3,682.8 -0.2 -1,189.6 
China 1.3 8,191.2 0.2 917.0 0.0 -358.0 1.1 7,335.3 
Japan 0.2 12,265.1 0.0 119.9 0.0 2,184.7 0.2 10,289.8 
Table 2. Balance Sheet for FTAs involving Korea, Japan, and China:  GDP Growth (%) 
and Economic Gains (U.S. $ in Millions) 
One reason this strong economic foundation exists comes from the fact China’s 
and South Korea’s economies complement each other.  Geographical proximity, 
inexpensive real estate, “readily available raw materials and cultural similarities, 
including the availability of bilingual workers of Korean ancestry,” all serve as 
complements that helped establish the bedrock.146  Furthermore, South Koreans need 
somewhere to expand its export-led economy in order to keep growing.  A close-
proximity large country in substantial need of imports for its massively growing economy 
could not serve as a better solution: 
The composition of trade between the ROK and China suits Beijing.  
Chinese exports of primary products (e.g. raw cotton, vegetables, soybean, 
maize, coal) and imports of manufactured goods (e.g. household 
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electronics, televisions, refrigerators, cement, plastics) fit well with South 
Korea’s own trade needs.147 
Pursuing this economic relationship seems sensible to South Korea.  The economies of 
both China and South Korea continue to grow and feed off each other, creating more 
prosperity for the people of both countries.  The deeper the roots of this relationship, 
fueled by their complements, the stronger the two countries will be able to weather 
whatever political storms may pass through this highly volatile region.  While some may 
point out the potential for competition as China’s production of products currently made 
by South Korea increases, only time will tell how South Korean businesses and the 
government respond.  But for the time being, their economies remain complementary.     
a. Business is Business 
Theory certainly provides a perfectly good explanation for why Seoul 
desires a strong economic relationship with China.  Nonetheless, one must acknowledge 
the basic premise that the two countries share this partnership merely because South 
Koreans view China as an “irresistible business opportunity.”148  As early as 1993, many 
small- and medium-sized companies in South Korea “chose China as the most suitable 
site for investment” for various reasons.149  This perception remained strong through 
2004 when respondents to a newspaper poll in South Korea declared China should be 
South Korea’s # 1 priority in economic and trade relations.150  Also, many companies 
have begun to “localize their presence in China so as to take advantage of the China 
market;” seeing it as a “second internal market.”151  This viewpoint only propels the 
pursuit of business opportunities. 
Aside from the complementary economies, South Korean companies 
pursue business in China because opportunities continue to abound.  In 2000, South 
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Korea’s internet and telecommunications industries experienced a “China fever” as they 
aimed to “capitalize on the expansion” of these industries in China after experiencing 
“triple-digit expansion” in their own country.152  Similarly, South Korean industries look 
to expand in China when the industry becomes saturated domestically, which can be seen 
through interest in the expansion of China’s nuclear energy industry as domestic plant 
construction has slowed.153  Another example of saturation includes South Korea’s home 
shopping television channels.  With five companies competing for less than 10 million 
cable subscribers, several have established joint venture operations in China (which has 
90 million cable subscribers) due to negative growth in their domestic market.154  At the 
same time, South Korean firms turn to China “to avoid the economic downturns in the 
U.S. and Japan.”155  Overall, China undeniably provides South Korea ample opportunity 
for its own economic growth.   
Looking at the relationship through the Liberalist paradigm provides good reason 
for South Korea to desire a strong relationship with China.  Not only does such a 
relationship encourage and sustain economic growth in both South Korea and China, it 
has played a role in preventing militarized conflict on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia 
itself as political tensions tend to subside due to the high economic stake. 
2. Multilateralism 
Another aspect of the Liberal paradigm is that of international organizations.  
Some believe collective agreements between countries lead to more outbreaks of peace as 
they work together to ensure stability within the region.  Samuel Kim summarized this 
aspect of the Liberalist theory: 
The core assumption of liberalism is that international organizations help 
states to cope with uncertainty and to pursue their interests cost-
effectively.  Through international organizations, regulative norms, rules, 
and governing procedures are established to provide member states with 
convergent expectations, transparency of actions, and improved 
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communication.  Multilateral institutions, including security institutions, 
represent a response to the problems of international cooperation created 
by large numbers of actors, and such institutions can affect the “national 
interest” cost-benefit calculations of states through their functions of 
generating and disseminating information, thus increasing the likelihood 
of international cooperation in N-person games, [a version of game theory 
that involves more than two players].156 
Compared to the rest of the world, multilateral organizations have developed relatively 
slowly in Northeast Asia.  But as part of its engagement policy, Seoul ostensibly has 
pursued such organizations.  This Liberalist desire for peace, stability and security 
through economic interdependence and multilateral organizations explains Seoul’s 
motives to reduce tensions with Beijing.   
Another positive outcome from pursuing a relationship with Beijing was the 
increased ability to establish multilateral institutions within Asia, a goal for Seoul.  At the 
same time, the development of these institutions became an “important vehicle for 
driving improvements in bilateral relations between China and South Korea.” (emphasis 
added).157  South Korean leaders wanted peace and stability in the region by reducing 
tensions on the peninsula.158  They saw this possibility through a relationship with China.  
Once that was established, they could pursue peace and stability in the region further by 
pushing for regional institutions. 
The governments of the three major countries in Northeast Asia (China, South 
Korea and Japan) have begun to hold trilateral meetings in recent years, regarding 
situations that affect all of them.  For example, the Environment Ministers from the three 
countries met in 2000 to look for ways to reduce the “yellow dust” pollution from China 
that coats Korea and Japan in sandstorms every spring.  A big step toward regional 
institutions occurred in 1999 when the East Asian Vision Group, suggested by President 
Kim Dae Jung, was established.  The Group’s purpose was “to study future ways for the 
East Asian community to integrate as a region, thereby following the lead of other 
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regional groups such as the EU and NAFTA” and included two representatives from each 
of the ten ASEAN members plus two each from Japan, China and South Korea.159  That 
same year, another breakthrough toward regional institutions occurred when the three 
countries’ leaders met on the sidelines for the first time during the ASEAN Plus Three 
meeting.  Though the idea came from Japan, Seoul was in full support:  “the call for such 
a meeting was definitely in line with Kim Dae-jung’s active advocacy of regional and 
multilateral dialogue, a building block for a future Asian community....”160   
Alongside its northern policy, Seoul pursued segyehwa, or globalization.  
Segyehwa “implied a leading role for South Korea in international organisations and the 
continued expansion of South Korea’s multi-directional diplomacy.”161  Not only did this 
globalization policy allow Seoul to engage China by placing its initiatives in the “context 
of a non-ideological and overarching foreign-policy vision,”162 but it also, if 
subconsciously, allowed Seoul to open Beijing up to the idea of multilateral institutions.  
Beijing, initially reluctant, eventually agreed to talks between the three Northeast Asian 
countries (South Korea, China and Japan) that Seoul continues to promote today.163  
Another benefit for Seoul included being perceived as an active and positive player in the 
region: 
[South Korea] was not a ‘normal state’ and not a fully accepted member of 
the international community.  Its identity in the region was as a security 
‘problem,’ and its fate was determined by others.  In this context, the 
ability to successfully engage a former adversary like China held 
significance.  It affirmed ROK developmental successes as an economy 
that others wanted to model and benefit from.  If China took the ROK 
seriously, this affirmed Seoul’s own view that its position in the system 
changed.  It was now a ‘player’ in the region and a proactive shaper, rather 
than passive subject, of its external environment.  As a power that sought 
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to bring China into multilateral organizations, the ROK fulfilled its own 
desires to be seen as a leader of regional tension reduction and dialogue 
rather than as a source of this tension.164 
Not only did Seoul pursue a relationship with China for the benefit of the country 
and its people, but it also pursued the relationship for the benefit of the region.  Seoul 
certainly subscribes to the Liberalist idea of international relations.  It seems to advocate 
the Kantian triangle described by Russett and Oneal.  Although it cannot necessarily push 
for democracy in China, its pursuit of economic interdependence and multilateral 
institutions with China (and Japan for that matter) signify its desire for peace through 
Liberalist ideas.   
C. LIBERALISM SUCCEEDS 
South Korean leaders wanted a rapprochement with China beginning in the 
1970s.165  But it was not until the late 1980s when the Cold War was winding down that 
Beijing began to open up to Seoul’s pursuits.  In fact, once the Cold War ended with the 
fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the relationship between China and South Korea began 
growing rapidly.  As pointed out in this chapter, Seoul’s pursuit of a relationship with 
China can be best explained through the Liberal paradigm of International Relations.   
Even South Korean leaders acknowledged this approach throughout speeches and 
actions since the 1980s.  When faced with the Realist paradigm about balancing its 
pursuit of China economically with the “requirements of the U.S.-ROK security 
alliance,” Korean analysts responded that with the Cold War over, they no longer needed 
to “view political, security, and economic relationships in zero-sum terms.”166  Victor 
Cha believes the end of the Cold War was necessary for the relationship to blossom 
because it changed the “strategic context… [and] that raised both the benefits of 
cooperation and the costs of non-cooperation.”167  Though the end of the Cold War may 
have been a necessary precondition, it certainly was not the cause of the Sino-South 
Korean rapprochement.  South Korea pursued China, and China accepted by opening its 
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doors to a former enemy.  Seoul pursued a relationship with China through the Liberal 
paradigm because it felt that was the best way to bring peace and stability to the region.  
So far, those leaders have been proven right as Cha acknowledges later in his article:  
“The dramatic transformation of China-South Korea relations in the 1990s represents the 
most successful case of engaging China in East Asia.”168   
 Now the relationship has become a self-reinforcing circle.  The diplomatic 
relations spark a strengthening of economic relations; the economic interdependence 
encourages quick resolutions of diplomatic disputes.169  Their relationship allows for the 
creation of multilateral institutions and these very same institutions drive Beijing and 
Seoul closer together.  It seems now all they need to do is ensure the circle has enough 
momentum to continue evolving.  Ultimately, Seoul has achieved its goal of increasing 
economic prosperity for itself and all of Northeast Asia.   
 While economic prosperity may serve as beneficial outcome, Seoul’s ultimate 
goal is to reduce tensions with North Korea.  As President Roh Tae Woo told Chinese 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in 1991, “What we want to do with North Koreans, who 
are of the same nation, is to abandon hostility and restore confidence and to establish a 
cooperative relationship.”170  Seoul pursued this goal through Beijing.  This pursuit 
succeeded in that Beijing’s involvement helped facilitate the historic 2000 summit and 
the Six Party Talks.171  Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings perhaps phrased it best 
when they wrote:   
While Seoul’s defense is bolstered through its alliance with the United 
States, and nuclear weapons issues are addressed with leadership from the 
United States, it recognizes the extraordinary role of China in other 
dealings with the North (particularly political matters such as defections, 
North-South meetings, and contacts with Koreans living in China near the 
North Korean border).172 
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Seoul’s explicit use of the Liberal Approach has helped to pursue its goal of reducing 
tensions with the North and, additionally, has afforded the country a huge economic 



























IV. WHY CHINA WANTS A STRONGER RELATIONSHIP WITH 
SOUTH KOREA 
While Seoul explicitly engages China through Liberal ideas, the reasons China’s 
leaders desire a strong relationship with South Korea may not be as transparent.  
Beijing’s actions in general cause debate amongst scholars and policy makers as its 
actions do not always match its stated foreign policy.  For example, whether China 
actually poses a threat to the United States underscores the uncertainty surrounding 
Beijing’s intentions.  American media regularly inundate viewers/readers with news 
stories questioning the role China will play in the coming decades.   
These questions pervade the academic world as well because Beijing’s actions 
can be explained through virtually all International Relations paradigms.  At the same 
time, looking to answer Beijing’s intentions with a specific paradigm only creates more 
questions.  The leadership’s quest for a strong relationship with South Korea, explained 
through Liberal terms, stems from the reasoning that the need and desire to continue 
modernizing through economic growth can be stimulated by following South Korea’s 
economic model as well as through a durable economic relationship.  However, most 
countries in Asia invest heavily in China and have developed extensive trading 
relationships.  An economic relationship with South Korea is not singularly important to 
Beijing when it has similar relationships with other countries.  Beijing’s desire, explained 
through Realist terms, is that the government feels it can secure national security through 
regional stability.  However, it does not exhibit expansionist or revisionist tendencies that 
substantiate many Realist claims.  Scholar Thomas Moore frames the complexity of 
Beijing’s foreign policy best when he wrote, “the challenge for China’s decision makers, 
of course, has been to balance these new economic interests with longstanding concerns 
about sovereignty, independence, and socialist virtue.”173 
This chapter contends the Chinese have created their own form of International 
Relations that will be called here, taking from a phrase the Chinese use themselves, 
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Realpolitik with Chinese characteristics.  Looking at their actions through this paradigm, 
Beijing’s foreign policy demonstrates realpolitik through taking control of each situation, 
although reluctantly; China stands to act as a regional hegemon whether its leaders desire 
such a role or not.  It has become the leader almost by default.  Yet the Chinese give their 
own twist to realpolitik by acting with discipline and by acting reactively rather than 
proactively, responding as necessary to each crisis as it arises.  This idea contradicts an 
aspect of Offensive Realism:  that should China continue to grow, it will inherit 
expansionist aims and “revisionist intentions.”174  In this light, Beijing’s reactivity 
highlights its aversion to expansion and revision; it highlights Beijing’s desire to be a 
stabilizing power.  Additionally, Chinese leaders have pursued good neighborly relations 
with countries in the region.  This disciplined, reactive and good neighborly outlook 
encompasses Beijing’s pragmatic approach to its regional hegemonic responsibilities.  
Therefore, China serves as a regional hegemon without the expansionist tendencies that 
would delineate its actions wholly through traditional Realist terms.  Toward South 
Korea specifically, China’s physical and economic size, geographic and cultural 
proximity, and historical strength on the peninsula, looked at through the Realpolitik with 
Chinese characteristics paradigm, explain its reasoning for a close and durable 
relationship.     
The “honest broker,” as Beijing is referred to in the current Six Party Talks, 
serves as a good example of Realpolitik with Chinese characteristics.  Being called the 
honest broker does not connote an expanding state with imperialist intentions.  Also, the 
world has witnessed far more mediating from Beijing during this nuclear crisis than in 
1994.  “China has never before undertaken such an activist diplomatic initiative solely on 
its own initiative.  Beijing literally stuck its neck out:  by Chinese standards of excessive 
caution, it took an enormously bold and risky step well outside its normal comfort zone” 
in its diplomatic efforts to “bring Washington and Pyongyang to the same [negotiating] 
table.”175  At the same time, Beijing somehow became the host, organizer and “honest 
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broker” although it did not even propose the actual idea of the Six Party Talks.  China’s 
increasing role in regional affairs, particularly involving South Korea, stems from its 
physical and economic size, geographic and cultural proximity and historical strength 
rather than from an intentional intervention.  Looking at how both traditional paradigms 
fail to fully explain Beijing’s desire for a strong relationship with South Korea, this 
chapter offers an explanation through China’s own version of Realism. 
A. DOMESTIC STABILITY THROUGH LIBERALIST TERMS 
Some scholars believe Beijing’s attitude toward regional affairs has evolved into a 
liberalist approach since the end of the Cold War.  This evolution explains its 
rapprochement with South Korea in 1992 and the expansion of their economic 
relationship since then.  These scholars claim China’s economic prosperity directly relies 
upon regional stability, particularly on the Korean peninsula since it shares a border with 
North Korea.  Hence, much of Beijing’s policies toward situations in Northeast Asia 
balance around its economic priorities.  Looking through the Liberalist lens, this section 
shows that while China’s leaders may be adapting their foreign policy to accommodate 
economic motives, the Liberalist view does not explain why they desire a strong 
relationship specifically with South Korea. 
1. A Liberal Argument for China’s Foreign Policy 
Economic prosperity serves as the main goal of China’s leaders today, and South 
Korea provides much stimulation in China’s economy.  In fact, the liberalization of its 
market in the late 1970s “made China receptive to trade with the South.”176  This trade 
grew steadily throughout the 1980s and skyrocketed after rapprochement in 1992.  
China’s leaders had to focus on the economic relationship—causing diplomatic (and 
military) relations to lag behind—out of deference to its historical and ideological 
relationship with North Korea.  Even today, the economic relationship between China 
and South Korea encompasses the majority of their overall relationship as Beijing still 
tries to keep its relationship between the two Koreas delicately balanced.  
Another argument claims China’s leaders need to offer economic prosperity to 
their citizens in order to maintain legitimacy and internal stability.  After the Tiananmen 
                                                 
176  Cha, "Engaging China: Seoul-Beijing Détente and Korean Security," p. 75. 
52 
Square tragedy and “the downfall of the communist system in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe largely caused, in the Chinese leadership’s view, by economic 
breakdown,” the Chinese government needed to ensure the economy continued to grow 
through successful economic reforms.  Some believe Beijing accepted Seoul’s 
approaches for rapprochement because of “the prospect for economic benefits.”177  Many 
took this move as a show of “how economic development was rearranging China’s 
priorities,”178  which supposedly signified Beijing’s adaptation of a Liberal approach in 
its foreign policy.   
The Chinese government undeniably has continued to adjust its policies to include 
economic interests.  A recent Congressional Research Service report states “economic 
success is affecting decision making and policies in the ranks of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP)” which has begun “including more of China’s business and other interests 
both in its membership and policies.”  The report goes on to state “an estimated 30% of 
China’s [mostly business elite] entrepreneurs (several million) are now members of the 
CCP.”  Additionally, other party members have “become involved in business or have 
strong business interests.”179  Thus while China’s leadership adjusts to “reflect the 
interests of the people,”180 it continues to strengthen economically its relationship with 
South Korea.          
Another factor proponents of the Liberal approach point out concerns Beijing’s 
use of South Korea’s economic growth as a model for its own growth:   
with seventeen-fold increases in gross national product (GNP) between 
1961 and 1978 and annual export growth rates averaging 42%, South 
Korean post-war economic success as one of the Asian ‘tigers’ provided 
potential lessons for Beijing’s own modernisation programmes.181 
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Similarly, China scholar Denny Roy uses an assertion made by Korea scholar Bruce 
Cumings that “Deng [Xiaoping] is really nothing more than the Park Chung Hee of 
China” to point out many “Chinese scholars…frequently discuss the applicability of 
South Korea’s experience to China.182  This applicability implies that Beijing, today, 
views South Korea as a roadmap for China to follow toward economic success.  In fact, 
Beijing has implemented lessons learned from the events in South Korea that led to the 
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998 in an attempt to prevent such an occurrence in 
China.183   
 Meanwhile, as discussed in Chapter III, Seoul engaged China to reduce tensions 
in the region.  Some believe the argument can be reciprocated as China needs stability on 
its border for economic growth.  Lee Tai To’s summary provides the best assessment:  
“for China, a more favourable security environment in the Korean peninsula would be 
more conducive to its efforts to concentrate on its own Four Modernizations.”184  
Moreover, others point out an explicit change in Beijing’s foreign policy toward a Liberal 
approach.  This change stems from the “smile strategy” that is designed to “coopt the 
interests of neighboring countries through trade and investment while putting forth a less 
threatening military posture.”185 
 Similarly, others point to Beijing’s increased involvement and promotion of 
multilateral institutions in not just Northeast Asia, but all of Asia as a sign of its Liberal 
approach.  The consensus seems to think China’s leaders first disliked the idea of 
multilateral institutions as they “feared [they] could be used to punish or constrain 
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China.”186  Eventually the Chinese began to view multilateral organizations as a way to 
balance against the United States.187  Additionally, some claim Beijing’s shift toward 
multilateral institutions “reflects the greater weight Beijing now places on regional 
financial stability as an important objective of Chinese economic security.”188    
a. Taiwan 
The Liberal approach asserts China’s strengthened relationship with South 
Korea signified another way to suppress Taiwan.  As a matter of fact, Seoul abruptly cut 
its diplomatic ties with Taiwan in exchange for rapprochement with China in 1992.  For 
Beijing, this break in ties implied a step up in international legitimacy and a step closer 
toward reunification.  When the South Korean government, the last one in the region to 
recognize the PRC over the ROC, cut the ties, Beijing solidified its right to existence in 
the region.  In the zero-sum game Beijing plays with Taipei, Beijing scored a huge 
success through the rapprochement with Seoul.  Beijing has developed three strategies 
toward Taiwan:  “verbal military threat, international isolation, and economic absorption.  
For the latter two strategies, South Korea is somewhat useful."189  For the Liberal theory, 
the latter is useful: 
[China’s] expansion of business ties with South Korea will induce 
Taiwanese to compete with South Koreans in the Chinese market, and 
China can use economic incentives to encourage a peaceful change in the 
PRC-Taiwan relationship.190 
However, thirteen years of established diplomatic relations between Beijing and Seoul 
have not eased China’s situation with Taiwan, contrary to the Liberal expectations 
highlighted above. 
Perhaps scholar Chae-Jin Lee provides the most comprehensive answer as to why 
China wants a strong relationship with South Korea economically: 
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First, [China found a country] eager to accommodate [its] economic 
preferences….Second, the Chinese found the intermediate technology of 
South Korea more suitable to their practical needs than the expensive 
high-technology of the United States, Japan, and Western Europe.  Third, 
they felt more comfortable with the sociable and outgoing South Koreans 
than with the Japanese…or with the Taiwanese….Fourth, the geographic 
proximity and cultural affinities between China and South Korea reduced 
transportation costs and barriers to communications….Fifth, China made 
use of the highly educated and professionally competent Koreans (about 
two million) residing in China who were ready to interact with their South 
Korean counterparts.191 
Even with Lee’s convincing argument, the fact remains that Japan, Taiwan and the 
United States remain bigger trading partners of China than South Korea does.192  The 
Liberal approach still fails to provide a complete answer as to why China desires a strong 
relationship with South Korea because while South Korea does offer ample opportunity 
to support China’s economic growth, many other countries fill that role as well.   
2. The Liberal Argument Misses the Target 
China undeniably enjoys its strong economic partnership with South Korea, and 
the opening of its markets increasingly affects the decisions China’s leaders make.  Many 
claim “the Chinese economic imperative, coupled with the passing of the cold war 
international system” led to China’s abandoning its “one-Korea position” for a 
“pragmatic two-Korea diplomacy.”193  However, this relationship does not separate 
South Korea from the other countries in Northeast Asia because Beijing’s economic 
imperative applies to all its neighbors.  In fact, every country, except Russia, in Northeast 
Asia: Japan, North Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan, holds China as its number one trade 
partner.194  While the economic relationship is important, it perhaps is not as important to 
Beijing as it is to Seoul.  To put things into perspective, if trade between the two 
countries were to end abruptly today, South Korea would suffer much more than China 
because China’s economic prosperity does not rely mostly upon South Korea. 
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 Some would argue China’s most important trading partner is Japan and 
oftentimes, South Korea’s economic relationship with China is compared to that of 
Japan’s.195  While some point out the similarities between Sino-South Korean and Sino-
Japanese relationships, others simply group them into one section of study when looking 
at China.196  Rarely does South Korea receive undivided attention (from non-Korean 
specialists) when studying China.  Its economic importance to China is not important 
enough to garner its own attention; it must share the spotlight with Japan.  Even today, 
Korea’s historical role of serving as the crossroads between major powers and falling in 
their shadows lives on.   
This relatively minor role in China’s affairs does not necessarily imply the 
Liberalism theory fails.  Indeed, the Liberal paradigm does explain Beijing’s recent 
foreign policy decisions, including ones involving South Korea.  Yet, Liberalism only 
provides part of the picture in this situation; it fails to fully explain why Beijing desires a 
strong relationship with its former adversary, particularly while maintaining a 
relationship with the other half of the peninsula.  Liberalism only highlights that Beijing 
has begun treating South Korea like it treats every other country in the region.  It does not 
explain what makes South Korea specifically so important, nor does it explain what made 
China change its view of South Korea from an enemy to a friend.     
 The claim Beijing uses South Korea as an economic model probably encompasses 
the strongest Liberal argument for Beijing‘s pursuit of a strong relationship with South 
Korea.  Perhaps Deng Xiaoping was inspired by Park Chung Hee’s successful reforms 
when he began liberalizing China’s market; however, Beijing probably does not use 
South Korea as a model today, contrary to popular belief in South Korea.  As mentioned 
earlier, Denny Roy quotes Bruce Cumings’ statement, “Deng [Xiaoping] is really nothing 
more than the Park Chung Hee of China,” to support this claim.  Yet Roy took Cumings’ 
statement out of context.  Cumings made the statement to point out “all manner of 
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political disorder can proceed without disrupting economic growth or dislodging the 
ruling groups”197 as Park Chung Hee proved during his brutal reign in South Korea from 
1961—1979.  Cumings was not arguing Beijing uses South Korea as an economic model; 
he was arguing that authoritarian regimes can be economically successful.  Cumings 
declares, instead, Beijing uses Singapore as its model.   
Nonetheless, the fact remains Beijing can use any number of Asian countries as a 
model because: 
China is quite frankly pursuing the latest version of the developmental 
state theory, one our economists cannot understand but that makes 
complete sense to Asians as diverse as former Japanese Prime Minister 
Kishi Nobusuke, Chiang Kai-shek, Park Chung Hee, Lee Kwan Yew, and 
Deng Xiaoping.198    
This diversity shows South Korea does not garner any special economic attention from 
China.  Furthermore, South Korea is not the only “Asian tiger;” therefore, why would 
China follow only South Korea’s model?   
 Nevertheless, Beijing certainly desires a strong relationship with South Korea—
which can be fully explained through Realpolitik with Chinese characteristics—and 
values the contribution South Korea makes to China’s and all of Northeast Asia’s 
economic prosperity.  While the Liberal paradigm highlights Beijing’s general foreign 
policy extremely well, it only partially explains South Korea’s value to China.  South 
Korea’s economic role in Northeast Asia does not differ much from the other countries in 
the region.  Further, the strong relationship Beijing desires and shares with South Korea 
is not merely the result of Beijing’s general foreign policy, it involves a lot more.  Thus 
the Liberal paradigm fails to fully explain why Beijing wants a strong relationship 
specifically with South Korea. 
B. REGIONAL HEGEMONY THROUGH REALIST TERMS 
The Realist paradigm categorizes China’s growth as a desire to hegemonically 
rule Asia, maybe even the world.  China’s military modernization program serves as 
evidence of its intentions to expand or assert its real power over its neighbors in order to 
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secure its own national interests.  Scholars who use the Realist paradigm believe 
Beijing’s desire for a strong relationship with South Korea represents its attempts to 
consolidate its power within the region.199   
Applying this idea to economics, “China is using the allure of its rapidly 
developing economy and trade relations to create a regional economic sphere revolving 
around China.”200  In Realist theory, “power resources are homogenous and fungible.”201  
Therefore, China’s economic power should then extend to other arms of statecraft.  For 
example, some believe Beijing desires this relationship with South Korea because having 
good relations with both Koreas (the only country in the world to hold such distinction) 
demonstrates Beijing’s growing political power; it creates a “source of pride in Beijing’s 
diplomatic prowess.”202  At the same time, Beijing is fully aware Seoul relies on it “to 
check North Korean recklessness.”203  Military and diplomatic relations with the North, 
economic and diplomatic relations with the South:  this “best of two worlds”204 lends to 
the belief China’s leaders desire regional hegemonic status.  Wu Xinbo, a Chinese 
strategist, agrees with this belief when he points out that since Beijing lacks the power to 
exert its great power interests, it limits itself to national and regional interests.205  Others 
believe Beijing began expressing interest in becoming a regional hegemon when it 
became convinced the 21st century would be the “pacific [sic] century.”  As Asia rises to 
the top during this century, China’s leaders want to “[create] a regional environment 
conducive to its economic modernization and national security.”206   
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For Korea specifically, scholars believe China’s leaders desire to exert its regional 
hegemonic power because Korea falls within the “natural sphere of influence.”207  
Considering the history of relations between Korea and China, such a belief has merit.  In 
modern times, other regional considerations provide evidence of Beijing’s drive for great 
power status.  Most everyone has come to the conclusion a unified Korea will fall under 
South Korean control.  When reunification occurs, Beijing wants to be on good terms 
with its possibly nuclear-armed new neighbor.208  At the same time, Beijing wants 
“leverage in shaping the eventual outcome of the divided Korean peninsula,” something 
it would lack without good relations with the South.209  Because Korea lacks the strength 
to challenge China directly, Realists argue China’s leaders want influence on the 
peninsula only to ensure no enemies of China gain influence on its border.210  A Realist 
could also argue Beijing displays its hegemonic tendencies by its expansion into the 
Korean peninsula precisely because neither Korea nor the two Koreas combined as a 
united one nation state can prevent this expansion.  This expansion might also explain 
Seoul’s bandwagoning tendencies.  Beijing’s exertion of power over its former “vassal” 
state may even signify (to its people at least) its return to the “Middle Kingdom” status it 
had held until the Western intrusion during the 19th century.  China might view the 
Korean peninsula as a stepping stone back up to its traditional role.  Some believe the 
Korguryo dispute in 2004 exposed this viewpoint.   
The PRC angered Koreans when Chinese scholars claimed in official documents 
the Koguryo Kingdom (37 B.C.—668 A.D.), whose territory included what is currently 
in northeastern China, had been a part of China, not “an independent Korean entity that 
produced many of Korea’s longstanding traditions.”211  What amounted to the largest 
political dispute between China and South Korea since the normalization of relations in 
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1992 highlighted Chinese fears that a unified Korea may try to reclaim the land of the 
Koguryo Kingdom that is now a part of China as well as Korea’s sensitivity of its 
history—some claim Korea was a vassal state of China at one time which Koreans 
adamantly deny—with China.  Nonetheless, some saw the controversy as a slipup by 
China that exposed its “true hegemonic ambitions.”212  They believe China wants Korea 
to return to its vassal state of pre-modern times. 
Additionally, Beijing pursues a relationship with Seoul to wean it off the United 
States’ support.  A break in the military alliance would “weaken what [China] views as 
an important link in the U.S. ‘encirclement’ of China.”213  This encirclement China has 
felt since the Korean War when Americans crossed into Chinese territory has got it “bent 
on shaping a longer-term strategic partnership against the United States in Asia.”214  
Further, Chinese leaders seem to believe the peninsula will be more stable as China’s 
influence rises while the United States’ influence declines.215  Another benefit a strong 
relationship with South Korea poses for China deals with the thorn in its side: Taiwan 
and the U.S. support of the island.  An economic relationship with South Korea allows 
Beijing to lessen its dependence on the United States.  Thus, “the Seoul connection 
provides China one more card to play vis-à-vis both the U.S. [sic] and Taiwan.”216 
In addition to the degradation of the United States’ role in Asia, Beijing seeks to 
balance against Japan’s power.  China’s influence in Korea would “undercut or offset” 
any attempts Japan might make to gain influence.217  While empirical evidence of such a 
desire on China’s part seems scarce, another viewpoint in Realist theory considers a 
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shared view by Korea and China toward Japan and thus a partnership to counter its 
influence: 
Both countries are seriously concerned about Japan’s growing economic 
dominance and potential political influence in Asia based on its substantial 
economic and technological strength.  Their apprehension is rooted in the 
legacy of mistrust arising from Japan’s past record of aggression against 
both countries in its quest for the Greater East Asian Coprosperity 
Sphere….neither China nor South Korea is willing to accept…broad 
Japanese leadership.  Their economic and strategic cooperation is believed 
to be necessary to constrain Japan’s growing influence as a regional 
power.218 
Ironically, North Korea’s similar anti-Japan sentiment may bring the three countries 
together in a way all other attempts have failed.    
 Even as Beijing supposedly pursues regional hegemonic status, it must still 
protect China’s borders, its national security.  Sharing an 880-mile border with North 
Korea requires Beijing, according to Realist theory, to gain influence on the peninsula as 
a way to prevent “any aggressive behaviour on the part of either Pyongyang or Seoul that 
would jeopardize the stability of the area and consequently the security of China.” It 
strives to achieve this stability through its growing influence, yet by acting as the 
mediator maintaining the balance of power, which will be discussed later.219   
 While the Realist theory proclaims Beijing is indeed exhibiting expansionist 
tendencies as it seeks to gain influence on the Korean peninsula by adhering to its two-
Korea policy, Beijing shows more of a reactive approach that detracts from an 
expansionist argument.  For example, the Chinese demonstrate they are fully cognizant of 
Korea’s sensitivity and refusal to be identified as a vassal state of China.  Thus Beijing 
desires a strong relationship with South Korea not because it wants to consolidate its 
power in the region as a hegemon but because it wants to be a good neighbor so everyone 
can enjoy peace, stability and prosperity. 
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C. REALPOLITIK WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 
China’s hundred years of humiliation has engraved into the mindset of the 
Chinese an aversion for hegemony and imperialism.  Their foreign policy decisions are 
considerably marked with reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries 
and with respect of other nations’ sovereignties.  While some believe this foreign policy 
approach merely reflects propaganda as opposed to actual intentions, Beijing’s actions 
toward South Korea show it has no intention of expanding into the Korean peninsula as a 
traditional regional hegemon, according to Realist theory, would do. 
 Instead, China—not surprisingly, based on its long history—has developed its 
own International Relations paradigm.  This paradigm seems to combine elements of 
both traditional International Relations frames.  As Thomas Moore phrases it, Beijing’s 
“pursuit of economic security and national development through multilateral cooperation 
could be characterized as a (neo-)liberal means to realist ends.”220  Additionally, Beijing 
has included some recent lessons learned:  “the Chinese have learned that there are 
neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies in international relations and that the 
hyperbolic rhetoric of socialist revolution and international solidarity is no longer crucial 
to fulfilling their national interests.”221  China is destined to be a regional power, but its 
leaders do not want the power struggle that comes with the Realist view of ascending to 
power: arms races, wars, etc.  Nor does the Chinese government want to be the sole 
power in the region; after witnessing U.S. dominance since World War II, the Chinese 
Communist Party prefers a multi-power system.  However, due to China’s physical and 
economic size, no other country in Northeast Asia will be able to match its power.  A 
strategy of interdependence and cooperation leaves Beijing inadvertently, rather than 
intentionally, in power.  This ascension leaves Beijing room to pursue peace and national 
security on its own terms, in its own way.  A look at three factors contributing to China’s 
relationship with South Korea—size, proximity and historical strength—not only offers 
insights into China’s interests on the peninsula but also provides good insight into 
Beijing’s general foreign policy toward its neighbors. 
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1. Size, Proximity, and Historical Strength 
 a. Size 
South Korea’s population, geographical area, and economy pale in 
comparison to that of China.  China’s population contains 27 times more people than 
South Korea, and 18 times more than the population of the two Koreas combined.  
China’s territorial size is roughly smaller than the United States while South Korea is 
roughly larger than the state of Indiana.222  China’s total gross domestic product for 2004 
ranked seventh in the world at $1.6 trillion while South Korea’s ranked 11th at $679 
billion.223  China’s size naturally makes it a leader.  Since its size significantly outweighs 
South Korea’s, unlike that of Japan’s, Beijing does not feel threatened by South Korea 
and therefore, can pursue its good neighborly approach specifically with South Korea.  
While critics believe Beijing’s approach reveals a Realist attempt to reach regional 
hegemonic status, scholar Eric McVadon explains, “fear of hegemony, by any party, must 
not obscure the fact that China is the largest and most populous country of the region and 
that it has legitimate aspirations for a constructive role in the security affairs of the 
region.”224 Needless to say, China’s size creates a role for Beijing to play in the relatively 
large situation South Korea currently faces; Beijing’s way of playing a role is to develop 
a relationship with both sides.  
b. Proximity 
Sometimes insensitively—inaccurately in the minds of Koreans—referred 
to as a vassal or tributary state of pre-modern China, Korea’s geographic proximity to 
China has always played a role in its history and in the creation of it as a nation.  Today, 
analysts of the relationship between China and South Korea highlight how their 
geographic and cultural proximity allow for cheaper transportation costs and more 
efficient business transactions.225  From China’s viewpoint, Korea’s propinquity has 
usually been a reason for its involvement on the peninsula: 
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Based on a very long legacy of Chinese cultural diffusion that contributed 
significantly to Korean identity and made Korea a major example of the 
Sinic cultural realm (albeit with substantial love-hate qualities that 
stemmed from a mixture of Korean attempts to improve upon what was 
imported from China and Chinese tendencies to be the Confucian big 
brother to Korea’s little brother), both nations entered the modern era 
thoroughly attuned to each other’s national interests.  As Korea’s closest 
neighbor, there has never been any doubt that China grasped the 
peninsula’s importance.226 
At the same time, historically some of China’s invaders have come to China through the 
Korean peninsula.  In addition, “the Korean peninsula shares a long border with China, 
and historically has served as an arena of conflict with Russia and Japan, China’s two 
traditional rivals.”227  This security vulnerability explains why Beijing has qualms about 
Korea allying with an enemy of China.  Ultimately, their geographic closeness has been 
the catalyst for close relations throughout their history and thus, cultural affinities have 
developed as a result.  Today, this geographical and cultural proximity continues to drive 
China’s relationship with South Korea as it has done throughout the traditional history of 
Sino-Korean bonds. 
c. Historical Strength 
The third reason China desires a strong relationship with South Korea 
stems from its historical strength in the region.  David Kang asserts China’s strength 
directly affects stability in Asia:  “historically, it has been Chinese weakness that has led 
to chaos in Asia.  When China has been strong and stable, order has been preserved.”228  
Consequently, this strength plays a large role in Korea—partly due to their proximity—
“Korea is one of the few places over which the Chinese shadow has traditionally been 
cast heavily, irrespective of the ebbs and flows of Beijing’s influence.”229  This historical 
role drives Beijing to continue exerting its influence as China has always done and 
explains its desire for a strong relationship with South Korea (as it already has as a 
                                                 
226  Olsen, Toward Normalizing U.S.-Korea Relations: In due Course? p. 89. 
227  Liu, "The Sino-South Korean Normalization: A Triangular Explanation," p. 1084. 
228  David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," International 
Security 27, no. 4 (2003): p. 65. 
229  Chung, "South Korea between Eagle and Dragon:  Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic 
Dilemma," p. 782. 
65 
relatively close relationship with the North) that is unique to its relations with other 
countries in the region.  Perhaps scholar Quansheng Zhao phrased it best when he wrote, 
“Chinese interest in the Korean peninsula has been based on the combined factors of 
national interest and the historical connections between China and Korea.”230  Moreover, 
scholar Robert Scalapino certainly put China’s historical strength into scale when he 
wrote, “From the beginning of recorded history, China has figured prominently on the 
Korean Peninsula.”231  While Koreans are adamant against becoming a “tributary state” 
again, that they appear to be bandwagoning with China as opposed to balancing against 
it, as a Realist predicts,232 shows they may be willing to accept, today, China’s historical 
influence on the peninsula.  
These three factors offer insight into Beijing’s Realpolitik with Chinese 
characteristics.  Not threatened by its neighbors and sharing similarities developed 
throughout history, Beijing defies traditional Realist theory of intentional intervention by 
pursuing great power responsibility through the pragmatic means of disciplined behavior, 
reactivity and good neighborly relations.  Nowhere is this unique paradigm more 
apparent than on the Korean peninsula. 
  2. Foreign Policy Chinese Style 
a. Discipline 
As one foreign policy expert expressed, Beijing holds hegemonic power 
but does not exhibit hegemonic behavior.233  When scholars use words such as 
“guarantor,” “intermediary,” and “counselor” to describe the role Beijing plays on the 
Korean peninsula, they emphasize the restraint with which the Chinese government 
exercises its hegemonic power.234  Using a more specific example, since China provides 
the most amount of aid to North Korea, it could “exert its maximum leverage” by cutting 
off all aid, forcing North Korea to follow Beijing’s wishes—something a traditional 
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hegemonic partner would be expected to do.  Instead, China’s leaders have engaged in a 
“shuttle diplomacy” to bring all parties involved to the Six Party Talks; they have acted 
as an intermediary.235  That “halting North Korea’s nuclear program is not the ultimate 
end China hopes to achieve” also reveals Beijing’s deviation from the security dilemma 
factor in the traditional Realist paradigm.  Rather than view the elimination of North 
Korea’s nuclear program as the elimination of a security threat—the ultimate end a 
Realist would expect—“China’s [more long term and more complicated] calculations, 
interests, and goals” instead delineate its own paradigm.236  
China’s own paradigm strays from Realism in this regard.  Its paradigm 
combines great power status with pragmatic means of discipline, reactivity and good 
neighborly relations.  Beijing’s role as an “honest broker,” Anne Wu, a former official in 
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argues “seems only natural” due to its good 
neighbor relations with all the countries involved.237  In the meantime, Beijing’s good 
neighborly relations with both Koreas allow it to hold a “constructive influence” over 
situations on the peninsula.238  
b. Reactivity 
A “constructive influence” goes hand in hand with being a good neighbor 
because a good neighbor is willing to help but does not overextend his welcome.  In this 
regard, Beijing also exhibits its deviation from the traditional Realist paradigm by being 
reactive rather than expansive.  Oftentimes, Beijing does not take a stand on a situation 
until it is forced to.  For instance, North Koreans seeking asylum in China put Beijing in 
a precarious situation.  On one side, Pyongyang denies the people are refugees and 
demands they be repatriated.  On the other, South Korean NGOs plead with Beijing to 
allow the refugees an escape.  Beijing essentially responded by turning a blind eye to the 
refugees unless a specific case garnered international attention in response to which it 
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would repatriate the North Koreans.  But as the number of refugees seeking asylum has 
dramatically increased recently, Beijing was “forced…to harden its position.”239   
Beijing displays similar behavior in core security situations.  For example, 
Beijing did not suggest the Six Party Talk format as a way to resolve the North Korean 
nuclear crisis.  Eventually, though, Chinese diplomats became the key players in ensuring 
the Talks continued and achieved some success.  Such reactive behavior typifies 
Beijing’s foreign policy approach to regional affairs.  This behavior also undermines the 
idea Beijing aspires for hegemony because the reactivity allows weaker states to have a 
role in determining the outcome; Beijing does not act unilaterally in accordance with its 
own interests without regard for the consequences others may experience, as a Realist 
would expect a typical hegemon to do.   
Being reactive does not come without its pitfalls.  Anne Wu provides an 
excellent analogy when she wrote:  “Beijing may be find itself ‘riding a tiger, afraid to 
dismount’—thrust forward into a protagonist’s role that it may not be fully prepared to 
play.”  Being reactive means Beijing loses total control; it may find itself having to work 
under circumstances it did not create; it becomes a “hostage to the behavior of potential 
adversaries and unreliable neighbors.”240  Yet, Chinese leadership seems willing to 
accept this limitation in exchange for a more peaceful and stable region.    
This reactivity signifies Realpolitik with Chinese characteristics.  Rather 
than setting expectations and demands that other countries would have no choice but to 
follow—as a traditional regional hegemon would do—China’s leaders choose a 
pragmatic approach that requires them to be reactive.  Waiting and listening to the desires 
of the actors involved allows Beijing to develop a more sound response to a situation.  
For instance, in the current nuclear crisis, Pyongyang wanted bilateral talks with the 
United States while Washington demanded multilateral talks.  After listening to these 
desires of the main actors, Beijing reacted by developing a sound response that combined 
elements of both countries’ desires.  After mediating, Beijing convinced Pyongyang to 
accept multilateral talks while preventing Washington from implementing sanctions 
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intended to end Kim Jong Il’s regime.  Similarly, Beijing has consistently refused to stop 
sending aid to North Korea in order to get its way with Pyongyang;  Beijing has 
employed a more sound, pragmatic approach of negotiations that respects North Korea’s 
sovereignty. 
c. Good Neighborly Relations 
Acting as a good neighbor comprises a third aspect of Beijing’s pragmatic 
approach.  This good neighbor policy “stemmed from the traditional Chinese belief that 
‘a good neighbor near is better than a relative afar.’”241  Beijing, as a good neighbor, 
remains more neutral in situations, which, in turn, gives it more room to develop a fair 
and pragmatic approach and/or solution.  Since “China has managed not to tilt toward 
Seoul at Pyongyang’s expense,”242 it now has the opportunity to find a more peaceful 
solution to the nuclear crisis.  Had Beijing never developed sound relations with South 
Korea, or had Beijing’s relations with North Korea deteriorated as a result of its relations 
with South Korea, today’s nuclear talks would see Beijing with little leverage in dealing 
with the United States or North Korea; it would not be the “honest broker” or mediator; 
its intentions of peacefully solving the crisis, in effect, would be marginalized.     
Additionally, dropping its ideological and militant tone toward its 
neighbors allowed Beijing to clear up many of its border disputes recently and to ease 
tensions it has shared with countries since the People’s Republic of China’s inception.  In 
the past few years, Beijing has settled most of its border disputes through what Jiang 
Zemin envisioned, “consultations and negotiations.”243  In many of these consulted and 
negotiated settlements, “China received only 50 percent or less of the contested territory.”  
Beijing has even improved relations with India, its longtime rival, through “confidence 
building and troop-reduction agreements signed in the 1990s.”  Now China’s border “has 
never been more secure.”244  For the current nuclear crisis specifically, Beijing’s good 
neighbor relationships “with Seoul, Washington and Tokyo on the one hand and 
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Pyongyang on the other uniquely qualify China to play the role of mediator.  China used 
its influence to encourage both sides to take steps to reduce tensions…”245  This quest for 
good neighborly relations highlights yet another deviation from the traditional Realist 
paradigm in which a great power would disregard the interests of other states. 
D. DISCIPLINED GREAT POWER 
 Scholar Suisheng Zhao provides an excellent overview of Beijing’s pragmatic 
approach to foreign affairs, its Realpolitik with Chinese characteristics: 
To work toward the perceived trend of multipolarization and to insure a 
favorable international environment for its modernization, pragmatic 
Chinese leaders have tried to avoid confrontational relations with the 
United States and other Western powers and, in the meantime, pursued a 
policy of defusing tensions along its immediate borders….Pragmatic 
strategy has thus gained power both from reacting to and absorbing from 
the outside world.  Pragmatic strategic behavior is flexible in tactics, 
subtle in strategy, and avoids appearing confrontational, but it is 
uncompromising with foreign demands that involve China’s vital interest 
or that trigger historical sensitivities.246 
Realpolitik with Chinese characteristics means China’s leaders pursue Realist ends—
great power status and responsibility—through their own pragmatic means, that of 
discipline, reactivity and good neighborly relations.   
 China’s size relative to, proximity to and historical strength over the Korean 
peninsula explains Beijing’s interest in South Korea, and Realpolitik with Chinese 
characteristics explains its approach to crises erupting on the peninsula.  China desires a 
strong relationship with South Korea because of its size, proximity and historical 
strength, but that cannot be understood without looking at the relationship through 
China’s unique International Relations paradigm.  Toward South Korea, Beijing’s 
discipline can be explained through its size compared to South Korea.  Although 
significantly larger, Beijing has not used that to its advantage when interacting with 
South Korea.  Beijing’s reactivity can be explained by its historical strength over the 
peninsula.  Beijing knows it will always play a role on the peninsula, it knows Korea’s 
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fierce preference for autonomy and independence, and it knows it has always respected 
that preference.  Beijing’s reactivity serves as the modern way to respect that preference.  
This reactivity is evidenced by Beijing’s reluctance to pressure Pyongyang too much and 
by its absence of influence in South Korea’s internal affairs.  Finally, Beijing’s desire for 
good neighborly relations can be explained by its proximity to the Korean peninsula.  As 
Korea’s closest neighbor, China’s good neighborly relations instills a trust that it can 
portray to other nations in the region and perhaps to the world.   
China’s physical and economic size relative to South Korea, geographic and 
cultural proximity and historical strength, considered through its newly formed pragmatic 
approach toward relations/situations with its neighbors—Realpolitik with Chinese 
characteristics—explain its desire for a solid relationship with South Korea in ways the 
Liberal and Realist paradigms fail to do.  The two traditional paradigms may shed partial 
light on Chinese foreign policy intentions.  However they both fail to acknowledge 
certain characteristics that distinguish Chinese foreign policy from others.  Similarly, 
they fail to adequately provide a unique reason for China’s situation with South Korea.  
While South Korean leaders explicitly and deliberately chose the Liberal theory to 
engage China, Beijing created its own path to engage South Korea.  This path contains 


















V. IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH KOREA 
With rising fears of a unilateral regime-change mission by the United States, 
Pyongyang manuevered to gain more aid and sympathy from the international 
community; a former ally, Russia; and most importantly, its bordering neighbors, South 
Korea and China.  Kim Jong Il recently implemented some but not all of Beijing’s 
recommended market reforms, and South Korea has built several special economic zones 
inside North Korea.  These actions helped North Korea to experience a slight economic 
growth in recent years.  Meanwhile, several conditions—Beijing coordinating the Six 
Party Talks, advocating a peaceful solution, Seoul agreeing with Beijing’s views (while 
maintaining its alliance with the United States), and the U.S. military focusing on 
Afghanistan and Iraq—have essentially limited Washington’s options.  Instituting 
sanctions, as Washington has threatened to do, will only be effective if China and South 
Korea participate since they comprise the most aid for and trade with North Korea.   
Beijing and Seoul seem to understand Pyongyang’s viewpoint; they seem to 
appreciate North Korea’s fears of a pre-emptive strike by the United States, especially 
since that fear realized would also tremendously damage China’s and South Korea’s 
economies and devastate regions in their own countries.  That Pyongyang’s two 
neighbors, whether implicitly or explicitly, understand its viewpoint should prove 
advantageous in the current nuclear situation.  Not only do the two countries understand 
Pyongyang’s concerns, but through similar cultures and familiar histories, the two 
countries also understand better how to read and respond to its actions.  For example, 
both countries seem extremely aware of Pyongyang’s preference for distant relationships 
and its fear of appearing as a China flunky.  With this kind of support while battling a 
global superpower, Kim Jong Il might have more of an advantage than people realize.  
After looking at North Korea’s historical (since its creation in 1948) and current 
relationships with both China and South Korea, this chapter will explore Pyongyang’s 
views on their growing relationship and the implications for North Korea.   
A. NORTH KOREA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA 
Beijing has pursued an unprecedentedly active role in resolving the current 
nuclear crisis on the peninsula.  Most believe Beijing can use its relationship with 
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Pyongyang to influence and pressure Kim Jong Il into following Beijing’s, and the rest of 
the international community’s, wishes.  Yet Beijing denies the relationship is strong 
enough to exert such pressure.  Nonetheless, Beijing seems to be using the close 
relationship it does share with both Koreas as justification to prevent any sanctions 
implemented by the United Nations at the request of Washington.  With this situation in 
mind, a history and overview of the current relationship between China and North Korea 
will help shed light on Pyongyang’s view toward China’s growing relationship with 
South Korea.   
China and North Korea have shared a close relationship in the nearly 60 years of 
North Korea’s existence.  Each country helped to fight off the other’s enemy: Koreans 
helped China to fight off Japan during World War II, and the Chinese helped North 
Koreans to push back the United States during the Korean War.  The bond “formed in 
blood” and their common ideological identity forged a strong relationship that lasted until 
the end of the Cold War.  With the fall of the Soviet Union and China’s opening of its 
market, North Korea soon became more of a liability to Beijing than an asset.  Even so, 
Beijing has maintained a closer relationship with Pyongyang than any other state has 
been able to accomplish.     
1. History and Evolution of the Relationship 
While China and Korea had a relationship in one way or another during all of 
Korea’s existence, the seeds for a relationship with North Korea were laid indirectly by 
the Japanese occupation of Korea.  The beginnings of this relationship eventually led to 
2.5 million Chinese troops, 900,000 of whom were killed or wounded, fighting on the 
North Korean side during the Korean War.247  The decades following the war saw a 
“warm official friendship” between the two states.  Both claimed their relationship was 
similar to that of “lips and teeth.”  This “lips and teeth” metaphor was reinforced when 
leaders, such as Premier Chou Enlai, made statements like, “China and North Korea are 
neighbors linked by mountains and rivers…. This friendship cemented in blood was 
forged and has grown in the course of the protracted struggle against our common 
enemies, U.S. and Japanese imperialism…. Common interests and common problems of 
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security have bound and united our two peoples together.”248  Even after China 
normalized relations with the United States in 1971, it maintained a close relationship 
with North Korea.  In 1982, Kim Il Sung declared the relationship “an invincible force 
that no one can ever break…. It will last as long as the mountains and rivers to [sic] the 
two countries exist.”249   
Competition with the Soviet Union also encouraged Beijing to maintain a close 
relationship with North Korea: 
China’s basic interest during and after the cold war has been to make 
certain that no other power ever again acquires a dominant position in the 
peninsula.  This called initially for a substantial economic and military aid 
role in North Korea that would offset the influential position enjoyed by 
the Soviet Union in Pyongyang as a result of its key role in installing the 
Kim Il Sung leadership.250 
Beijing competed by donating as much aid as it could, by exporting at reduced prices, 
which they called “friendship prices,” and by barter agreements.  It also helped North 
Korea by “[constructing] oil refineries, petrochemical plants, and other industrial 
facilities.”251  However, as the Soviet Union began to decline in the late 1980s and after 
Moscow and Beijing renormalized their relations, Beijing’s desire to support North Korea 
so wholeheartedly began to wane.    
a. The End of the Cold War 
Relative to the Soviet Union, Beijing kept close relations with Pyongyang 
while the assistance diminished.  Moscow, faced with an economic implosion, had no 
choice but to reach out to the West, including Seoul, for help at the geopolitical expense 
of North Korea.  While Pyongyang was not surprised at Moscow’s abrupt recognition of 
South Korea, it certainly felt no need to mask its displeasure.252 
                                                 
248 As quoted in Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, p. 230. 
249 Ibid., p. 231. 
250  Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement, p. 311. 
251  Ibid. 
252  Kang, C. S. Eliot, "North Korea’s International Relations:  The Successful Failure?" in The 
International Relations of Northeast Asia (Lanham: 2004), pp. 285-286. 
74 
Beijing, on the other hand, had better prepared itself.  While implementing 
open market reforms internally, it also began reaching out to the West earlier and more 
cautiously so that it avoided an implosion similar to the Soviet Union’s.  In particular, 
China developed a relationship with South Korea during the 1980s that did not jeopardize 
its relationship with North Korea: 
…China had been carrying out a carefully calibrated Korea policy that 
separated economics from politics.  Its dual-track diplomacy had allowed 
China to enjoy the fruits of a close trading relationship with South Korea 
without official relations while maintaining close political ties with North 
Korea…253 
However, once Moscow established diplomatic relations with South Korea, Beijing had 
to follow suit “in order to maintain diplomatic parity with the Soviet Union.”254  
Additionally, with the weakening of the Soviet Union, Beijing no longer had concerns 
“that adjusting their policy toward South Korea could push Kim Il Sung into the arms of 
the Soviet Union.”255  Even so, China’s leaders pursued a gentler course than Moscow 
did with North Korea, letting Pyongyang know (through several visits by high ranking 
people) changes were on the horizon and, specifically, Beijing’s normalization of 
relations with South Korea one month before they announced it to the rest of the 
world.256  Furthermore, as an example of China possessing a better understanding of how 
to deal with the two Koreas than others, Chinese leaders later claimed “that flattery and 
saving face had been keys to obtaining North Korea’s acceptance of the change.”257   
On another note, some say Beijing began distancing itself from Pyongyang 
because the ties relied mostly on personal relationships “at the highest levels.”  As 
leaders from both countries who had experienced the Japanese invasion and occupation 
of China and the Korean War began to pass away, the relationship between the two 
countries began to erode.  Proponents claim as “old, key revolutionaries…died…. 
                                                 
253 Kang, C. S. Eliot, "North Korea’s International Relations:  The Successful Failure?" in The 
International Relations of Northeast Asia (Lanham: 2004), pp. 285-286.  
254  Ibid. 
255  Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, p. 231. 
256  Ibid., p. 245, 247. 
257  Ibid., p. 247. 
75 
Chinese foreign policy toward North Korea has now become more ‘businesslike,’ rather 
than the old fashion of ‘comrades plus brothers.’”258  No matter what caused the 
distancing, the fact remains that China still provides more aid, engages in more trade and 
enjoys closer diplomatic relations with North Korea than any other country today.      
2. History and Evolution of Economic Relationship 
China remains North Korea’s top trading partner today, accounting for nearly half 
of North Korea’s overall trade259 with a trade volume of more than $1 billion.260  At the 
same time, China is believed to be the largest provider of aid, including grain and fuel, to 
North Korea, increasing aid when others decrease and vice versa or using it as leverage to 
influence decisions by North Korea.261  This increase in trade and aid, however, is rather 
new. 
Of course, economic relations were good immediately following the Korean War 
as China and North Korea held close ties in all areas of statecraft.  In fact, North Korea 
surprised many countries around the world as it displayed economic growth at rates 
higher than that of South Korea through the early 1970s.  After the war, Beijing began by 
eliminating all war debts Pyongyang owed it.  Through the 1980s, Beijing competed with 
the Soviet Union in providing economic aid and trade relations.  When the competition 
began to wane as the Soviet Union’s economic power began to decline, Beijing straddled 
itself between a pragmatic business approach—such as demanding hard currency 
payment at world market prices rather than bartering and exporting at “friendship 
prices”—toward North Korea and one of increasing its influence and leverage on the 
peninsula for its own national security purposes.  Though Beijing eased its demand for 
hard currency payments soon after it made the demand, trade and aid, for various reasons, 
declined throughout the 1990s.262  In fact, bilateral trade dropped from its “peak level of 
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nearly $900 million in 1993 [to] a mere $370 million in 1999, according to PRC 
statistics.”263  But as Pyongyang finally began to implement some of Beijing’s 
recommended economic reforms, trade began to increase again, “bilateral trade nearly 
doubled from 2002 to 2004 to $1.39 billion, according to KOTRA.”264     
3. Their Relationship Today 
China undeniably holds deeper political and economic relations with North Korea 
than any other country does.  This depth can be seen through North Korea’s economic 
growth in recent years that stemmed from reforms based on the Chinese economic model, 
Beijing’s ability to coax Pyongyang to join the Six Party Talks265, and the fact that “the 
China-North Korea relationship remains the most enduring, uninterrupted bilateral 
friendship for both [countries].”266  Indeed, some scholars believe Kim Jong Il’s visit to 
China shortly before the historic North-South summit in 2000 “signals the importance of 
China to Pyongyang.”267  Also, Beijing reduced its military aid to North Korea because 
its “military policy toward the Korean peninsula increasingly emphasized the reduction 
of military tensions.”268  Nonetheless, Pyongyang still keeps China at a distance.  While 
it certainly needs China on its side as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, 
part of Pyongyang’s juche philosophy drives it to desire less dependence on China, to not 
be a China “flunky,” or sadaejuui.269  Others also believe “Pyongyang is distancing itself 
from Beijing to a certain extent to strengthen its position in the regional power 
games.”270  The Chinese, familiar with Korea’s history and thus reasoning, understand 
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North Korea’s position and consequently, play within the bounds Pyongyang has set.  
Hence, while North Korea’s feelings toward China vary, it certainly values the 
relationship too much to end it any time soon. 
B. NORTH KOREA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTH KOREA 
To call what North and South Korea share a relationship may seem inappropriate, 
but it suffices for simplicity’s sake.  Splitting in 1948 with a brutal war following, the two 
Koreas headed down entirely separate paths for the next four decades.  Bitter enemies 
and arch rivals, exacerbated by the great powers that supported them, they antagonized 
each other, sometimes even with violence.  But with the end of the Cold War, the two 
Koreas could take steps in the pursuit of reconciliation that otherwise had been 
previously unavailable. 
After the Korean War ended, North Korea stood in better economic shape because 
it contained most of the heavy industries developed in the country at that point.  South 
Korea did not catch up in per capita income until the early 1980s.271  But as the Cold War 
died down, thawing fears, and as South Korea surpassed North Korea economically, the 
two countries began opening up to each other.  Seoul more strongly pursued engagement 
through its nordpolitik and “sunshine”272 policies, leading South Korea to open up more 
than the North.  A prime example occurred in 1988 when Seoul ended South Korea’s side 
of the trade ban that had existed since the two Korea’s inception because both countries 
had desired “economic self-sufficiency.”  Pyongyang responded by relaxing its 
posture.273     
Throughout the 1990s, relations improved under South Korean President Kim 
Dae Jung.  His moves succeeded in part because of North Korea’s dire food shortages 
during that decade:  “in general…the economic crisis in North Korea dictated that 
progress in the North-South dialogue, and a wider improvement in relations with the 
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West, became absolutely imperative.”274  This economic shortage required North Korea 
to import rice from South Korea for their “first-ever official bilateral trade” in 1991.  This 
trade opened the floodgates as “South Korean trade and investment emerged as probably 
the best hope of rapidly increasing its supply of foreign exchange.”275  Seoul and 
Pyongyang made even more progress when they both agreed to a denuclearization of the 
peninsula in 1991.  Without this agreement, Pyongyang would not have agreed to shut 
down its Yongbyon reprocessing plant in the nuclear freeze agreement with the United 
States in 1994.276 
Another reason the North began opening up to the South stems from the 
leadership of Kim Dae Jung.  Unlike previous South Korean presidents, he “offered an 
unprecedented opportunity for improved North-South relations on terms acceptable to the 
North.”277  North Korean officials, though initially skeptical, were impressed by Kim 
Dae Jung’s actions.  His pushing the United States to ease sanctions against North Korea 
and his “support for Hyundai president Chung Ju Yung’s plan to develop a tourist resort 
in the North near Mount Kumgang (Diamond), especially his support for generous terms 
that gave Pyongyang quick infusions of hard currency,” convinced North Korean leaders 
he was serious in his endeavors to engage North Korea.278   
Kim Dae Jung’s steadfast belief, not espoused by his predecessors, that 
engagement was the key to reducing tensions in the region (hence his engagement with 
China and multilateral regional institutions) paved the way for the unprecedented growth 
in the inter-Korean relationship witnessed through today.279  In fact, his “steady 
engagement (even if Pyongyang [didn’t] reciprocate immediately)…played a key role in 
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keeping the United States in dialogue with North Korea.”280  Kim Dae Jung’s endeavors 
also helped lay the foundation for the historic 2000 summit. 
In early 2000, Kim Dae Jung began proposing a summit with Kim Jong Il.  His 
March 9th speech in Berlin offering tremendous assistance to North Korea convinced the 
ailing regime to consider Kim Dae Jung’s proposals.  Five days later, Pyongyang sent a 
message for secret meetings to discuss the possibility of a summit.  The Koreans’ quick 
preparations led to a successful, historic 3-day summit in mid-June.  Topics of discussion 
ranged from “reunions of divided families, exchanges of cultural and sporting groups, 
and meetings of the military and civilian government officials.”  Although they naturally 
faced some obstacles along the way, Kim Dae Jung rightfully declared after the summit, 
“A new age has dawned for our nation.”  More specifically, Kim Dae Jung told the South 
Korean people:  
I found that Pyongyang, too, was our land, indeed.  The Pyongyang people 
are the same as we, the same nation sharing the same blood…. We lived as 
a unified nation for 1300 years before we were divided 55 years ago 
against our will.  It is impossible for us to continue to live separated 
physically and spiritually.  I was able to reconfirm this fact first-hand 
during this visit.  I have returned with the conviction that, sooner or later, 
we will become reconciled with each other, cooperate, and finally get 
reunified.281   
The success of the summit led to increased economic ventures, cultural and sports 
exchanges throughout the following years. 
 Although growing beforehand, economic enterprises expanded profoundly after 
the summit.  Two major South Korean name brands began selling televisions made in 
North Korea.  Pyongyang saw its first branch of a South Korean bank.  Also, a joint 
North-South venture began to market a brand of cigarettes to both countries.  The two 
Koreas also witnessed an auto race that began in South Korea and ended in the North.282   
 Much like it did with China, Seoul also pursued sports diplomacy with its 
northern counterpart.  Merely three months after the summit, North and South Korea 
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marched in the opening ceremony of the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney under one 
flag.283  Two years later, North Korea sent its “first-ever boatload of athletes, musicians, 
and cheerleaders” to South Korea for the Asian games.284  In 2004, the two Koreas 
entered the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens together under the unification flag again.285  
Although the two teams still competed against each other as in Sydney, the table tennis 
team did hold a joint practice for the first time since 1991 in Athens.286  Further 
progressing, in late 2004, the two Koreas and China agreed to have invitational friendly 
matches of table tennis.287  More recently, the two Koreas announced in November 2005 
that they agreed in principle, with the details to be worked out later, to send a joint team 
to the 2008 Olympics in Beijing.288 
While this opening up by North Korea seems promising to some, others remain 
skeptical.  These critics still believe Pyongyang wants to dominate the South; they 
believe it is still playing a “zero-sum security game.”289  They cite Pyongyang’s 
advances as tactical but not strategic, merely satisfying short-term interests.  Particularly, 
scholar C.S. Eliot Kang argues Pyongyang has become the “odd man out”290 in Northeast 
Asia because while the other countries in the region have embraced economic 
interdependence and globalization, “North Korea has held fast to the militant antiforeign, 
anticapitalist values and ideas that have guided its external policy since its founding.”291  
Kang further declares, “North Korea has been unable to redefine its national interests and 
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‘identity.’”292  Kang believes that because Kim Jong Il still uses the juche policy of self-
reliance to give his regime legitimacy within the country, North Korea’s recent advances 
do not necessarily indicate long-term success.  He also points out that although North 
Korea’s continued existence implies its “unique diplomacy” has been successful, the 
“accomplishments have come at an enormous price…famine and the lingering threat of 
war.”293   
Kang and other critics may be reacting too quickly.  Perhaps Pyongyang’s recent 
advances do indicate a change in “its national interest and ‘identity.’”  Beijing began 
shedding its communist identity in the late 1970s when Deng Xiao Ping introduced 
economic reforms, but only recently have the implications of that change surfaced.  
Moscow’s national interests and identity changed so quickly only because the Soviet 
regime imploded.  North Korea began experiencing economic growth two years after the 
historic 2000 summit with its brother to the south.  Indeed, some proponents view the 
actual occurrence of the summit as a symbol of strategic change of policy in 
Pyongyang.294  If it continues to grow, Pyongyang, like Beijing, may begin to adapt its 
national interests and identity to that of the region.  Beijing now uses the PRC’s 
economic success to garner legitimacy instead of communism; perhaps Kim Jong Il will 
pursue the same logic if he can liberalize North Korea’s market enough.     
Also, Pyongyang’s actions no longer endorse the idea of a zero-sum security 
game.  It seems more concerned with its own survival than competing with the South for 
dominance; it now looks at gains in “absolute rather than relative terms vis-à-vis the gap 
with the South.”295  In fact, a former staunch ideologue who had defected, Hwang Jang-
yop, admitted “a communist revolution in the South was no longer a viable DPRK 
objective.”296  Several prominent Korea scholars also believe it is “highly unlikely that 
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North Korea currently retains such aggressive intentions [i.e., plans to invade South 
Korea] in any serious way.”297  Andrew Scobell highlights a spectrum of Korea scholars 
in his monograph, North Korea’s Strategic Intentions, in which he points out David 
Kang, Bruce Cumings and Victor Cha all believe the North “desires ‘peaceful 
coexistence with the South.’”298 
As reclusive as North Korea is, some scholars believe it faces an internal struggle 
between reformers and the “Old Guard,” remaining revolutionaries and comrades of 
North Korea’s first leader, Kim Il Sung, who had helped establish communist North 
Korea.  These same scholars usually consider Kim Jong Il a reformer wanting more 
economic interaction with the South but is prevented by the Old Guard who still believe 
strictly in self reliance.  The reformers in North Korea view more economic interaction 
with the South “as the quickest way to get a large-scale infusion of capital and 
technology.”299  In fact, Kim Jong Il, in June 2003, supposedly told the Hyundai-Asan 
Chairman at the time, “South Korean businessmen can provide the North Korean people 
with an effective shortcut for understanding what capitalism is.”300  Thus, even while 
combating the Old Guard and other remaining resistance to South Korean business north 
of the DMZ, the interaction between the two Koreas has undeniably grown since the 
2000 summit. 
With the summit diluting many of the obstacles erected at the end of the Korean 
War, South Korea’s food aid to the North also increased heavily.  While South Korea has 
provided nearly 2 million metric tons of government food aid since 1996, almost all of it 
came after the summit, which can been seen in Figure 10:   
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Figure 10.   South Korea Food Aid to DPRK, 1995-2004301 
 
When Pyongyang halted the bilateral reconciliation process in July 2004, Seoul “linked 
provision of humanitarian assistance to North Korea returning” to the talks, which it did 
in the first half of 2005.  At the same time, the South stepped in to fill the gap created 
when other countries began dropping their donations to the North in 2002.  Also, the 
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a multinational 
organization designated in 1994 to provide “a package of benefits in return for a freeze of 
North Korea’s nuclear program,” received most of its contributions from South Korea, 
which gave more than $1.3 billion.302  Moreover, the South has contributed $72 million 
in rice aid per year during the past few years to the North, “even purchasing rice from 
abroad in June 2004, due to domestic shortages.”303  While North Korea has benefited 
from South Korea’s consistent aid since the summit at the turn of the century, South 
Korea has also intensified its trade interactions. 
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Trade between the two countries has relatively skyrocketed since the summit.  In 
2001, South Korea’s trade with North Korea surpassed the level at which Japan traded 
with the North and reached half of the China-North Korea trade level by 2004.304  In fact, 
South Korea became the North’s second-largest trading partner, behind China, 
consuming about 23 % of North Korea’s total trade volume in 2003.305  In the first three 
months of 2005, South Korean trade with North Korea increased by 58% when compared 
with the same period in 2004.306  Not only have aid and trade increased since 2000, but 
business ventures and investing have increased as well.  However, very few of these 
ventures have yet to make a profit.307  This growth, then, explains many South Koreans’ 
desires to reconcile with their countrymen to the north. 
This desire perhaps was best illustrated when the first products made by both 
South and North Koreans in North Korea at the Kaesong special economic zone went on 
sale at a department store in Seoul.  The $19 stainless steel pots sold out in two days as 
shoppers grabbed them “to give to relatives, friends and South Koreans whose ancestral 
towns are in North Korea.”308  This same sentiment echoes in the business sector: “In 
2001, 50 per cent of all South Korean companies engaged in business with the North 
were motivated by humanitarian and nationalistic aims.”309   
A reporter for The New York Times, Norimitsu Onishi, interviewed a South 
Korean who had decided to open a factory in the North because of “the cost of labor in 
North Korea, which is even cheaper than in China, the common language and his 
personal belief that free enterprise could coax the North further out of its shell.”  That 
man expressed the sentiment best when he told Onishi, “I concluded that North Korea is 
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not anyone else’s problem.… It’s our problem as one people.”310  Since the 2000 summit, 
many South Koreans have begun to see North Korea in the same light as the factory 
owner, Yoo Chang Geun.  Polls have shown that 60% of South Koreans think aid to 
North Korea was “acceptable or should increase.”  Meanwhile, 39% chose North Korea 
and 24% chose the United States when faced with a choice of with which country to 
increase cooperation.311   
Pyongyang, in its own way, has demonstrated it desires this increase in 
cooperation as well.  From an economic viewpoint, the act of opening up to its archrival 
on its southern flank signifies a desire for cooperation in and of itself.  Additionally, 
some South Koreans claim North Korean officials have actually pressed the South “to 
quicken the pace of development” at the Kaesong special economic zone.312  At the same 
time, North Korea’s strong anti-U.S. sentiment creates an avenue for the country to 
cooperate with liberal political parties in Seoul that favor more aid to the North than the 
conservative (and normally pro-U.S. stance) parties.313  Meanwhile, changes at the DMZ 
constitute further cooperation.  In July 2005, loudspeakers at the inter-Korean border 
were removed as part of an agreement to remove equipment and materials used for 
propaganda in that area.314   
Ultimately, North Korea sees South Korea as its brother but also as a puppet of 
the United States.  Opening up to the South may have been out of necessity, but it is also 
driven by the idea of brotherhood.  Shortly after returning from the 2000 summit, 
President Kim Dae Jung stated: 
…the most important reason for the opening was North Korea’s desperate 
economic travail, which made assistance from the outside world essential 
to its survival.  ‘Without improved relations with South Korea, others 
won’t help them….’  Other reasons…were the failure of North Korea to 
sideline the ROK while responding to the United States; global pressures 
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for détente from China, Russia, and other nations; and Pyongyang’s 
growing trust that the South’s policy was actually aimed at assisting the 
North rather than undermining it.315   
As fears of absorption subside and anti-Americanism in South Korea rises, North Korea 
may open up more to its brother.  Either way, looking at the inter-Korean relationship 
certainly gives insight into North Korea’s views on South Korea’s growing relationship 
with the DPRK’s closest ally, China. 
C. VIEWS ON THE GROWING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUTH 
KOREA AND CHINA 
Scholars should expect the growing relationship between China and South Korea 
to put Pyongyang in a precarious situation.  Its closest ally befriending its main enemy 
seems to be the ultimate paradox.  Yet Pyongyang reacted more harshly to Moscow’s 
establishment of diplomatic ties with Seoul than it did to Beijing’s.  In fact, Pyongyang 
seemed to barely notice, or acknowledge at least, the new relationship.  Retired journalist 
Don Oberdorfer states Pyongyang accepted the rapprochement with “official silence,” 
and when he asked the North Korean foreign minister, Kim Yong Nam, about a month 
later, the minister replied the new relationship was “’nothing special … nothing [that] 
matters to us.’”316   
On another note, Pyongyang views both countries with suspicion.  Although 
China serves as its closest ally, many North Koreans seem to distrust China and its 
intentions.  For a country that believes in self-reliance for success and survival, relying so 
heavily on China does not sit well with many North Korean officials317.  On the other 
hand, Seoul’s pursuit of a relationship with China probably seems like a backdoor 
absorption approach to North Korea.  So why did Pyongyang hardly react when Seoul 
and Beijing established relations?  Why does North Korea not seem to care as the 
strength of the relationship has only increased since 1992?  Does it not fear two of its 
border countries may be attempting to contain it? 
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Pyongyang does not really have a choice.  Kim Jong Il seems acutely aware he 
cannot stop this relationship from growing.  Generally speaking, in the post-Cold War 
era, “North Korea was placed in a position that compelled it either to accept isolation or 
to make the best of the situation by demonstrating some flexibility.”318  Scholar Barry K. 
Gills points out Pyongyang demonstrated this flexibility through its complete reversal on 
the issue of joint UN membership in the early 1990s.  After opposing two Koreas in the 
UN for two decades, Pyongyang reversed its policy when its allies declared they would 
not block South Korean membership.  Not wanting to “allow the South to enjoy sole 
representation, which in effect would have meant accepting the de-legitimisation of the 
DPRK,” Pyongyang chose flexibility over isolation by opting for joint membership.319  
North Korea has also demonstrated more of this flexibility through its implementation of 
a few of Beijing’s recommended market reforms and through the increase of inter-Korean 
relations after the 2000 summit.   
Pyongyang may not view this growing relationship as threatening.  Shortly after 
Seoul-Beijing rapprochement, Chinese leaders went through great lengths to reassure 
Kim Il Sung of “China’s uninterrupted high regard for the Sino-North Korean solidarity 
forged during the Korean War.”320  Consequently, the North Koreans may believe that no 
matter how close Beijing gets to Seoul, “the Chinese will help North Korea as much as 
they can for the sake of preventing a collapse of its system or military instability.”321  
Additionally, the relationship between China and South Korea has proven beneficial for 
North Korea as aid from these two countries has increased, as it has experienced 
economic growth due to efforts by China and South Korea (economic models and 
industrial complexes), and as it thus far has successfully avoided U.N. sanctions during 
the Six Party Talks largely due to unwillingness by China and South Korea to participate 
in the sanctions.  At the same time, Pyongyang adamantly displays reluctance to become 
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China’s flunky.  Rather than accusing South Korea of becoming one, Pyongyang has, 
instead, continued making progress toward reconciliation.  Such action perhaps indicates 
North Korean leaders do not feel threatened by the PRC-ROK relationship like it does by 
the relationship between South Korea and the United States.   Meanwhile, neither Beijing 
nor Seoul has given Pyongyang the impression it is trying to contain or change the 
regime.   
Ultimately, Pyongyang’s basic goal seems to be “simply to survive in a hostile 
world.”322  This goal reflects its views on the growing relationship between China and 
South Korea.  Scholar Chae-Jin Lee believes “the North Koreans adopted a realistic 
approach toward China’s growing linkage with South Korea and sought China’s 
diplomatic and economic assistance as much as possible.”323  Additionally, Seoul 
pursued a relationship with China to reduce tensions on the peninsula.  A common 
sensical by-product includes reduced tensions from the viewpoint of North Korea.   
Perhaps North Korea thought a growing relationship with China meant South 
Korea would be distancing itself from the United States.  Indeed, Pyongyang began 
viewing Washington as an asset in its “strategic calculus” during the 1990s;324 however, 
as Seoul grows closer to Beijing, perhaps North Korean leaders hope the United States’ 
role in the South will be marginalized, decreasing the perceived threat North Korea faces.  
Pyongyang certainly hoped Beijing’s normalization with Seoul would help reduce this 
perceived threat through an improvement in its own relations with the United States and 
Japan.  When Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen made a secret trip to Pyongyang 
just before normalization with Seoul, he portrayed to North Korean leader Kim Il Sung 
this idea of reciprocation on the part of the United States and Japan as one of Beijing’s 
arguments for recognizing Seoul.”325  Similarly, a marginalized United States would 
have limited influence on a unified Korea, a situation Pyongyang undoubtedly desires.  
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As scholar Edward A. Olsen states, China and the United States are “two powerful 
countries that view themselves as indispensable…. [And] act as though they have the 
right to exert their influence in ways that the two Koreas should heed.”326  Although 
desiring no foreign influence on Korea at all, Pyongyang clearly would choose China 
over the United States to have the most influence on the peninsula.  Seoul moving closer 
to Beijing may give Pyongyang the impression such a scenario is possible.   
Either way, reduced tensions most certainly equal a better chance of survival for 
Kim Jong Il’s regime.  On the other hand, even if Pyongyang were upset with China for 
recognizing Seoul, it needs China to survive.327  Especially after the Soviet Union 
collapsed, and thereafter Russia’s weakened ability to help North Korea, China remained 
the biggest provider of aid to the ailing country.  Furthermore, the Chinese “[continue] to 
protect North Korean interests at the UN and the IAEA.”328  Now that South Korea has 
joined the ranks of aid providers and major trade partners, North Korea has enmeshed 
itself in a triangle in which it needs both China’s and South Korea’s support to survive.  
The necessity of China’s support for survival leaves Pyongyang with no choice but to 
accept Beijing’s relationship with Seoul.   
While it may need China (and increasingly, South Korea) to survive, Pyongyang 
certainly does not want to rely so heavily on anyone.  Its policy of juche, independence 
and self-reliance, is the antonym of sadaejuui, “serving and relying upon foreign power,” 
(what it believes South Korea does).329  Thus Pyongyang tends to harbor suspicions 
toward China.330  This viewpoint may carry over toward Seoul as well as the two 
countries become more and more interdependent.  However, if Pyongyang continues to 
demonstrate the flexibility Gills pointed out, as it comes to rely more and more on its two 
neighbors, it may continue to establish diplomatic relations with more countries in an 
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effort to distance itself from its two main supporters.  In this regard, juche’s relevance 
within North Korea seems to be decreasing and opening up is something both China and 
South Korea would prefer North Korea to do.   
Kim Dae Jung perceived this possibility during his presidency and related it to 
Oberdorfer:  “they realized if they continue [isolation] like this without cooperation with 
the outside, they cannot maintain their system.”331  Pyongyang views the growing 
relationship between South Korea and China as unstoppable and whether they like it or 
not, North Korean leaders know they still need China in order to keep their country in 
existence.  Thus, perhaps they see the advantage of this growing relationship.  With 
China and, indirectly South Korea, in its corner, Pyongyang holds more negotiating 
power with the rest of the world.  Furthermore, these two countries understand very well 
Pyongyang’s desire for distance through juche, know North Korea’s entire history and 
share a cultural affinity.  These three dynamics make Pyongyang’s relations with China 
and South Korea and with the rest of the world a lot easier.  Perhaps Kim Jong Il sees this 
relationship as a key ingredient to ensuring his regime and country survive.  
Consequently, if Kim Jong Il is the reformer some scholars claim he is, maybe he wants 
this relationship to grow so he can take full advantage of it.  He knows he cannot stop the 
relationship, so perhaps he thinks he can milk them both to prop up his regime. 
While scholars debate if North Korea’s current reforms are tactics or strategies 
and if Kim Jong Il desires reform or not, one thing is for certain:  North Korea (as most 
countries do, presumably) wants to survive.  It needs China to do so.  Furthermore, with 
Seoul’s desire for peace and stability through engagement, a growing relationship with 
China does not necessarily pose a threat to North Korea’s survival.  In fact, it probably 
increases the chances, and Pyongyang recognizes this probability.  Thus, while not 
explicitly supporting a strong relationship between its number one ally and its supposed 
archenemy, Pyongyang does not protest it. 
D. CONSEQUENCES FOR NORTH KOREA 
This growing relationship between China and South Korea could imply positive 
outcomes for North Korea.  Not only does North Korea need help from anyone willing to 
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give it, but receiving help from two countries who are sensitive to Pyongyang’s 
viewpoint can prove advantageous.  Further, the engagement strategies of Seoul and 
Beijing toward Pyongyang have influenced Kim Jong Il’s decisions to implement 
reforms, which although slight, are reforms nonetheless.  However, Pyongyang faces a 
dilemma in that it must find a way to adapt its juche policy in order to maximize the 
possible benefits from this relationship. 
North Korea’s trade with other countries has increased since the turn of the 
century, primarily due to its modest opening up.  The historical inter-Korean summit in 
2000 led to industrial complexes that have encouraged South Korean businesses to invest 
in North Korea and led to Pyongyang establishing diplomatic ties with 19 new 
countries.332  At the same time, North Korean authorities have authorized private 
markets—with some limitations of course—to the extent that most cities now have a 
town market.333  Pyongyang has also taken steps to broaden property rights.334  Although 
“periodic tensions” between Pyongyang and Beijing have risen occasionally due to 
China’s pressure for economic reforms335, Kim Jong Il’s visit to Shanghai in 2001 
proved fruitful as North Korea has experienced economic growth, though small 
(approximately 2-3 % each year) in the last two years.  During his first visit to Shanghai 
in seventeen years, Kim visited the Shanghai Stock Exchange, a U.S.-Chinese automobile 
manufacturing joint venture, and Chinese companies in the information technology sector 
and appeared extremely interested in the role of a stock market in the state.336  David 
Kang believes this growth shows how serious North Korea is about “opening up to the 
outside world,” which was partly influenced by Chinese success, so far.337  Although 
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Pyongyang experienced some setbacks in economic reforms in late 2005, Kim Jong Il 
made an unofficial visit to China in January 2006.338  Not only did he meet with 
President Hu Jintao and the other eight members of the Politburo Standing Committee, 
but he and the economic officials in his traveling party also toured southern China’s 
prosperous economic regions and special economic zones.339  While the purpose and the 
results of the trip remain unclear, Kim Jong Il’s second trip to China in five years, during 
both of which he praised China’s economic success, shows North Korea is serious about 
its opening up.         
China serves as a nice conduit with which North Korea can pursue its relationship 
with South Korea.  As the “threat” from the United States continues to loom large, 
Pyongyang can use Washington’s ally to allay its security fears brought on by the United 
States.  Pyongyang would not be able to pursue this tactic without Beijing’s involvement.  
With the United States on one side and China on the other (in this situation specifically), 
South Korea sitting on the fence allows Pyongyang to pursue aid or inter-Korean 
relations without upsetting the balance.  Seoul’s relationship with North Korea’s number 
one ally implies another opportunity for Pyongyang to defy Washington’s wishes (that 
Seoul and Beijing do not support) and thus, maintain its sovereignty.  As the growing 
relationship proves more and more beneficial for North Korea, the Bush Administration’s 
desires to incite a regime change, to contain the country, or to even pursue theater missile 
defense in the region become effectively marginalized.  Similarly, the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI), an initiative by the United States to stop the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction while in transit from reaching their desired destinations,340 
has become less effective against North Korea due to the “non-participation of China and 
South Korea.”341 
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The strong relationship between China and South Korea implies a balancer 
against the United States in other ways as well.  Both countries desire an engagement 
policy while Washington prefers a more hard-line approach that may lead to the collapse 
of Kim Jong Il’s regime.  This relationship effectively undermines any actions the United 
States can take, outside of war.  Not only can Beijing veto any sanctions Washington 
brings to the United Nations, but any sanctions attempted against North Korea would fail 
unless both China and South Korea participate since they provide the most aid for and 
trade with North Korea.   
Another implication centers on the changing hierarchy in East Asia.  Pyongyang 
understands the potential significance this growing relationship has on the future 
dynamics of Asian politics.  As China rises to power in the region, South Korea stands 
poised to ride on the coattails of that rise.  For North Korea, to be in good favor of, or at 
least understood by, the rising powers of Asia has its benefits.  Currently considered the 
odd man out, Pyongyang may find itself with an opportunity to be included in this new 
hierarchy.  As Pyongyang takes steps toward international recognition, having the 
support of the dominant powers in Asia will also add to its credibility and legitimacy.   
For scholars believing Pyongyang’s recent reforms merely imply tactical changes 
that lack any real internal reform, the relationship between China and South Korea holds 
implications as well.  Kim Jong Il can use this relationship to continue attempting to drive 
a wedge between the United States and South Korea by capitalizing on the relationship 
between the South and China.  In other words, Pyongyang can take the carrots the two 
countries offer as a way to entice them for more help and to keep holding off the United 
States.  It could even try to keep the stand off with the United States continuing as a way 
to keep more aid coming from the China and South Korea.  Ultimately, Kim Jong Il can 
play China and South Korea off against each other once the “threat” from the United 
States dissipates in order to continue receiving more aid.   
Alexandre Mansourov of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies seemed to 
encompass a wide spectrum of implications and Kim Jong Il’s options when he stated: 
Kim’s games seems to be to promote “national cooperation” between the 
North and the South, play up historical anti-Chinese nationalist sentiments 
across the DMZ, and gradually, albeit reluctantly, increase his reliance on 
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the ROK for economic assistance, diplomatic support, and military 
guarantees, thereby reducing the DPRK’s lopsided dependence on and 
strategic vulnerability to China, giving a stake to Seoul in the survival of 
his regime, and, in the long run, using the South as a leverage in his own 
bargaining with the Chinese, or even forging a common North-South front 
in dealings with the PRC.342 
Mansourov also states that throughout all of history, “China can make or break any 
Korean state.”  North Korea’s leaders know this and are aware of China’s 
indispensability in Korean unification.  They know “an ascending Korean power must 
align itself with China, because of China’s enormous political, economic, and military 
potential, huge stakes, and a high degree of sensitivity to geopolitical developments on 
the Korean peninsula.”343  Seoul seems to be pursuing this route already; Pyongyang 
probably knows it cannot stay behind.   
While most implications suggest a positive outcome for North Korea, it runs the 
risk of mishandling its opportunities (i.e. reverting back to its isolationist ways).  Therein 
lies a problem:  how can Kim Jong Il adapt his juche policy to embrace an 
interdependence with China and South Korea?  He cannot easily denounce the policy as it 
serves as the “central ideology legitimizing the rule of the ‘Kim dynasty’ in North Korea 
and its claim to the once and future unified Korea.”344  Kim Jong Il must find a way to 
legitimize interdependence with a suspicious-looking China and his country’s rival to the 
south through juche in order to maximize the potential benefits of this growing 
relationship. 
 Perhaps Kim can use juche to proclaim Asian self-reliance against the “imperial 
United States.”  Another option includes replacing juche with another foundation for 
legitimacy like the Chinese Communist Party has replaced communist rhetoric with 
economic prosperity.  As long as Chinese citizens continue to enjoy the fruits of China’s 
economic growth, the CCP will remain in power.  Kim Jong Il can pursue a similar 
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course.  If North Koreans begin to experience prosperity through economic growth, Kim 
Jong Il can peacefully transition his legitimacy away from the failed idea of self-reliance.  
Whatever he does, the long-term implications and current tactical benefits for North 
Korea of the growing relationship between China and South Korea will amount to 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The growing relations between South Korea and China undoubtedly carry 
implications beyond North Korea.  As China’s power grows alongside its relationship 
with South Korea, the power structure in Asia will change.  With both countries sharing a 
distrust of Japan, the implications of this relationship for Japan could be negative.  
Meanwhile, if policy makers in the United States decide to contain rather than engage 
China, not only does China’s growing relationship with a U.S. ally carry potentially 
negative implications but so does the United States’ strengthening alliance with Japan 
since that may further alienate Japan from Asia or create a polarized region with the 
potential to spark a new Cold War.  After providing a summary of the main argument, 
this chapter highlights specific implications for Japan and the United States and will 
provide recommendations for policy makers in the United States.  
A. SUMMARY  
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the growing relationship between South 
Korea and China, determine why each country desires a relationship with the other and 
then study the implications of this relationship for North Korea.  South Korea and China 
began trading indirectly in the early 1980s.  The end of the Cold War and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, Beijing’s rival, opened opportunities for China 
regarding North Korea.  The end of the Cold War signified Beijing no longer had to view 
South Korea as part of the evil enemy, and the fall of the Soviet Union meant Beijing no 
longer had to compete for Pyongyang’s attention.  These two antecedent conditions 
paved the way for Beijing to respond to Seoul’s engagement strategy, Kim Dae Jung’s 
“sunshine policy.”  Gracefully normalizing relations with Seoul while maintaining 
amicable relations with Pyongyang allowed Beijing to reap the benefits of its new two 
Koreas policy.   
South Korean entrepreneurs expressed their approval of the normalization in 1992 
through their increased business transactions with their Chinese counterparts.  While 
trade between the two countries had been steadily increasing throughout the 1980s, it 
skyrocketed after the normalization of relations and has continued to rise ever since, 
signified by China’s overtaking of the United States as South Korea’s #1 trade partner in 
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2002.  At the same time, South Korean businesses have opened many factories in China, 
increased their foreign direct investment and have specially devoted attention toward re-
industrializing the rust belt, an area in northeastern China near the Korean peninsula.   
While the economic relationship has continued to grow and has become the 
foundation of the relationship between the two countries, Seoul and Beijing slowly 
developed diplomatic and military ties, the slowness stemming from Beijing’s deference 
to Pyongyang’s wishes.  Nonetheless, diplomatic relations have grown as visits between 
state ministers have increased since 1992, consulates have been opened, and a 
“cooperative partnership” has been pursued.  This cooperative partnership became most 
apparent during the Six Party Talks as Seoul and Beijing worked to defuse the nuclear 
situation through peaceful means.  Military ties were even slower to develop, due to each 
country’s respective alliance concerns, but have grown over the past few years, signified 
by military exchanges, defense minister visits and port calls.  Cultural and social ties have 
increased as well with many South Koreans showing interest in China through a rise in 
tourism and student exchanges and with many Chinese becoming obsessed with Korean 
pop culture. 
This multi-faceted growth of an unlikely relationship—considering they were 
mortal enemies during the horrific Korean and tense Cold Wars—can be understood by 
studying why each country desires such a relationship through the two traditional 
International Relations paradigms, Realism and Liberalism.  While South Korean 
entrepreneurs pursued insatiable business opportunities, the government acted in kind.  
The South Korean government explicitly pursued an engagement strategy based on the 
Liberal idea of economic interdependence in order to reduce tensions on the peninsula.  
This strategy, culminating in the normalization of relations in 1992, created more room 
for economic maneuverability.  South Korean businesses took full advantage of this new 
opportunity, which in turn, deepened the economic interdependence the government was 
looking for.  So far, Seoul’s strategy seems to have worked as the economic relationship 
has helped the two countries to overcome diplomatic rows, and tensions on the peninsula 
have been reduced.  The major successes of this economic interdependence include the 
Six Party Talks that have so far prevented provocative sanctions and full-out war on 
North Korea and the historic 2000 summit where the two Korean leaders met and took 
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significant steps toward reconciliation.  In both cases, heavy Beijing involvement paved 
the way toward the actual occurrence of each event. 
The Liberalist theory of economic interdependence does not, however, fully 
explain Beijing’s desire for a strong relationship with Seoul.  Beijing does appreciate 
South Korea’s contribution toward China’s economic growth and modernization.  
However, with so many Asian countries contributing, South Korea’s contribution cannot 
be enough to solely explain Beijing’s desire.  On the other hand, the Realism theory also 
fails to explain Beijing’s desire as it suggests Beijing is seeking to gain regional 
hegemony through great power status and is using South Korea as a stepping stone 
toward such status.  With the Korean peninsula currently one of the most volatile spots in 
the world, Beijing’s unique position of good relations with both countries makes it 
practically indispensable when resolving crises as they erupt.  Though this position 
provides further evidence for Realists that Beijing desires regional hegemony, Beijing’s 
actions generally fall short of a power-hungry expansionist.  Instead, China’s leaders 
pursue their own version of Realism; a version that propels China into leading Asia 
through the 21st century but not through violent, imperialistic means.  China’s approach 
includes discipline, good neighborly relations and a pragmatic, reactive response to 
situations as they arise.  This Realpolitik with Chinese characteristics, combined with 
China’s physical and economic size, geographical and cultural proximity, and historical 
strength respective to Korea, makes a good relationship with the peninsula desirable.  
With a relationship sealed in blood with North Korea, Beijing then pursued a relationship 
with South Korea at its earliest possible opportunity.  
Kim Jong Il largely has no choice but to accept this growing relationship.  He 
needs Beijing’s support to keep his regime and country afloat and has never really viewed 
South Korea as the enemy, just as a puppet of his enemy, the United States.  Perhaps he 
does not even view this relationship as a threat since both have increased aid and trade in 
the past few years and North Korea has opened up, establishing diplomatic ties with 
countries throughout the world, including most of Europe.  At the same time, Kim Jong Il 
knows this growing relationship cannot be stopped.  Overall, the implications for him 
seem favorable:  both governments desire to keep his regime afloat, to encourage North 
Korea’s success through economic reform, and to see the United States moderate its 
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approach toward North Korea.  Even as Kim Jong Il confronts the hard-liners within his 
organization, he can bring North Korea to join South Korea in a political position that 
stands to benefit from China’s rise in power.     
B. CHANGING POWER STRUCTURE IN THE REGION  
China potentially can return to its historic leadership position, or “gravitational 
center,”345 as it continues to grow and gain more power in the years to come.  Assuming 
the other countries in the region accept a hierarchical order with China on top as it was in 
the past, Beijing stands to gain great power status.  Even if “a century of chaos and 
change, and the growing influence of the rest of the world (in particular the United 
States), would lead one to conclude that a Chinese-led regional system would not look 
like its historical predecessor,”346 China’s power cannot be denied, as discussed in 
Chapter IV.  Thus the power structure in the region has the potential to change, and with 
South Korea in a position to gain from China’s power, Japan’s future as an influential 
power in the region can look bleak.  Furthermore, the rising anti-American sentiment in 
South Korea, coupled with the strong alliance the United States shares with Japan leaves 
the United States potentially looking at a bleak future as an influential power.   
1. Japan  
While China serves as Japan’s number one trading partner and Japan trades 
heavily with South Korea, neither Beijing nor Seoul want this strong relationship they 
share with Japan to strengthen Japan’s influence in Asian affairs.  The historical 
animosities—recently highlighted by the massive protesting of Japan’s history 
textbooks—China and Korea feel toward Japan cloud much of the diplomatic 
relationships—although the economic relations continue to remain stable.  As Korea and 
China grow closer, this antagonism could imply an alienation of Japan. 
This alienation may prevent Japan from integrating itself with Northeast Asia.  If 
the Chinese continue to distrust Japan while it revises its pacifist constitution, “Chinese 
leaders might be compelled to shift back to a hardline stance vis-à-vis Japan.”  However, 
since their “mutually beneficial economic relationship” has grown so vastly 
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interdependent and serves as the foundation for their diplomatic relationship,347 Tokyo 
should be able to avoid complete alienation providing their economies continue to 
fluorish. 
On the other hand, Tokyo views the rise of China as a “primary strategic 
challenge” and has responded by strengthening its alliance with the United States.  At the 
same time, though, as difficulties between Japan and the United States have surfaced 
since the end of the Cold War, Tokyo has turned toward Asia, pursuing multilateral 
institutions and bilateral approaches “to nurture a more benign regional security 
environment.”348  These actions imply that should Washington ever abandon Japan, 
Tokyo may have no choice but to join South (and North) Korea in a close relationship 
with China.  However, if Washington remains involved with Japan, tensions may 
continue to mount as the Korean peninsula leans toward China.  Hopefully, the economic 
interdependence will prove strong enough to stabilize the region. 
2. United States 
Revisiting each of the three countries’ (the United States, South Korea and China) 
goals and why Seoul and Beijing have pursued relations with each other in pursuit of 
their respective goals may provide the clearest picture as to what this growing 
relationship implies for the United States.  Additionally, these implications vary, 
depending upon the goals of the United States.  Based on these implications, six policy 
recommendations for leaders in the United States will be presented. 
a. Why South Korea Desires a Strong Relationship with China:  
Implications for the United States 
For this study, Seoul’s particular goals include reunification with North 
Korea, international legitimacy and a closure in the economic gap between itself and 
North Korea.  With these goals in mind, Seoul pursued a relationship with China through 
Liberalist means in order to achieve economic interdependence.  This interdependence 
helped to reduce tensions on the peninsula which brought the Koreas closer to 
reunification.  Meanwhile, Seoul’s successful engagement of China was meant to signify 
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South Korea’s true acceptance into the international arena.  Finally, Seoul wanted a 
strong relationship with China in hopes that it would create opportunities for engaging 
North Korea, thereby increasing the economic success of the ailing country. 
Seoul’s goals and its approach to these goals imply Washington may be 
losing its influence in South Korea.  Clearly, Seoul has chosen a Liberal approach in its 
regional foreign policy, an approach Washington may not necessarily agree with.  This 
Liberal approach has led to China’s usurping the United States as South Korea’s #1 
trading partner.  Furthermore, a Chinese scholar noted in his 1989 article in the Beijing 
Review, “[South Korea] is trying to discard the image of being ‘little brother’ to the 
United States, because the image is not compatible with its economic strength.”349  
Similarly, Washington’s hard-line approach conflicts with Seoul’s Liberal approach 
toward national security.  Though Seoul currently shows no willingness to reduce its 
strategic alliance with the United States, as Beijing adopts Liberal approaches to 
situations in the region, Seoul may find itself drawing closer to Beijing.   
On top of increasingly similar approaches between Seoul and Beijing, the 
two countries “share a long history of complex, intimate relations” that has lasted 
approximately 1,500 years.350  While this history may not play an overt role in the 
growing of relations today, it surely helps, and therefore, it contributes to the decrease of 
relevance in Washington’s role on the peninsula.  Similarly, Seoul, over the past few 
decades, has been on a quest to achieve international legitimacy.  As China tends to show 
more respect toward Koreans than the United States does351 and Beijing tends to take 
Seoul more seriously than Washington does—in the viewpoint of Koreans—the 
implication seems to indicate Washington will lose more ground in South Korea.   
South Korea clearly wants to eventually reunite with North Korea.  
Beijing seems to have accepted reunification as an inevitability and has taken steps to 
prepare for a new country on its border—some believe that is why Beijing pursued a 
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relationship with Seoul: to be on friendly terms with the expected ruling government of a 
unified Korea.  Washington, on the other hand, has no formal plan to deal with 
reunification.  It has thought through neither the potential consequences, both good and 
bad, nor of the impact reunification will have.  This lack of planning affects decisions 
Washington makes today involving Seoul; in fact, this lack of planning makes 
Washington indecisive and an ill advisor regarding the Korean peninsula and regional 
affairs in general.  This lack of planning also implies lost ground for Washington. 
Similarly, Seoul pursued Beijing because of its close relationship with 
Pyongyang.  Thus far, the pursuit has seemingly worked as the Koreas have taken steps 
toward reconciliation.  Washington, on the other hand, has provided a military deterrent 
that has prevented North Korea from invading South Korea again.  Though significant in 
its own right, this military deterrent has produced fewer results in reducing the threat 
from North Korea than Seoul’s and Beijing’s engagement approach.  As engaging North 
Korea results in more and more success, the implication for the United States will be lost 
ground in South Korea.    
Seoul’s pursuit of a strong relationship with China has brought it closer to 
achieving its goals mentioned above, far closer than its relationship with the United 
States has.  Therefore, this growing relationship implies Washington may be losing its 
presence and influence in South Korea.  It also implies Washington’s hard-line approach 
toward North Korea will not work.  Since Seoul desires economic success for North 
Korea (so that reunification will not be an economic burden), its engagement policies 
conflict with Washington’s containment policies.  With Seoul serving as the #2 aid 
provider and trader with North Korea (and with China being #1), Seoul’s Liberal 
approach implies the United States’ approach will not produce acceptable results.   
It must be stressed, however, Seoul currently expresses extreme reluctance 
to breaking its alliance with the United States.  In fact, Seoul currently sees itself as the 
intermediary between the two major powers of the region.  The “worst-case scenario” for 
South Korea is to be caught in the middle of a face off between China and the United 
States, particularly in relation to the Taiwan issue.  The government does not want to 
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have to choose between the two.352  And while hoping to become the mediator, Seoul 
would prefer to avoid the issue altogether.  Regarding this sensitivity, Beijing stresses it 
is not looking to become a substitute for the United States in South Korea, but rather, to 
act as a supplement.353   
While this assertion seems to imply Washington should not be concerned 
about the growing relationship between South Korea and China, the reality is that Seoul 
will mostly likely not join Washington if it attempts to contain China.354  Moreover, 
while Seoul currently values its relationship with Washington enough not to replace it 
with Beijing, China’s growing power coupled with the growing relationship between the 
two countries implies this value may decrease.  A particular sign of the United States’ 
decline in South Korea is the intensifying anti-American sentiment.  The rising of Korean 
nationalism has partially fueled this sentiment.  “Many Korean intellectuals” blame the 
United States for the separation of Korea and for the Korean War itself, based on 
decisions the United States made that “openly invited Communist aggression from the 
North.”  While Koreans do appreciate the United States’ help during both World War II 
and the Korean War, the government “has had the bitter experience of being largely 
ignored as Washington [deals] with important issues affecting Korean national interests.”  
Thus, Koreans are weary and “believe that, if necessary, the United States may abandon 
South Korea again in favor of U.S. global strategic interests.”355  This skepticism, 
alongside rising Korean nationalism, fuels the anti-American sentiment that is growing as 
the Koreans who remember Americans as saviors retire and younger generations take 
their place in government and society.  With the increasing resentment of an American 
presence—and the other factors listed above—in mind, the growing relationship between 
South Korea and China implies a declining influence of the United States on the 
peninsula.   
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b. Why China Desires a Strong Relationship with South Korea:  
Implications for the United States 
Beijing’s goals, for this study, include friendly relations with its neighbors 
(including a unified Korea), national security, economic growth and the survival of Kim 
Jong Il’s regime.  In an attempt to attain these goals, Beijing pursued strong relations 
with South Korea because of its size, proximity and historical strength relative to its 
neighbor; its desire for regional hegemonic status via discipline, reactivity and good 
neighborly relations; and its preference for regime survival in North Korea.   
The biggest implication for the United States of Beijing’s pursuit of a 
strong relationship with South Korea is that China’s involvement with South Korea will 
not diminish anytime soon.  The relationship is something Washington must begin to 
contend with as it makes decisions regarding South Korea or the peninsula in general.  
With this major implication in mind, other implications fall into three categories:  1) if 
the United States views its power in the region as zero sum 2) if the United States views 
its power in the region as non zero sum and 3) its approach toward North Korea.  In the 
first two categories, the issue of Taiwan will be discussed as well. 
If the United States holds a zero-sum mentality, China’s reasons for 
pursuing a relationship with South Korea implies a loss of power and influence in 
Northeast Asia for the United States.  It also implies a slow degeneration of its influence 
in Seoul—slow because according to Beijing’s foreign policy paradigm, Realpolitik with 
Chinese characters as described in Chapter IV, Beijing’s rise in influence in South Korea 
will be disciplined.  Finally, Beijing’s growing relationship with Seoul implies 
Washington cannot ignore Beijing; it will have to consider Beijing’s preferences when 
making decisions regarding the peninsula and the region as a whole.  In that sense, 
Beijing’s growing relationship with such a close ally to the United States implies a threat 
to U.S. global power.  South Korea, a country held closely under Washington’s wing 
much like Japan, may soon be under Beijing’s wing, symbolizing a loss in overall global 
power for the United States.  In this light, Beijing’s pursuit of a relationship with South 
Korea may imply the United States should overtly improve its relations with Taiwan and 
boost its defense of the island in order to maintain parity with China.  Overall, the 
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implications of Beijing’s pursuit of a relationship with South Korea in a zero-sum 
mentality measure in losses of drastic proportions. 
On the other hand, if the United States employs a non-zero-sum mentality, 
the reasons Beijing has pursued a strong relationship with South Korea hold positive 
implications for the United States.  In the words of David Kang, Northeast Asia will 
become more stable and peaceful under a disciplined China.  This peaceful stability will 
provide an opportunity for Washington to lessen its dedicated resources in the region.  
This peaceful stability will also improve the overall condition of the world as Asia’s 
economic success continues to prosper.  For Taiwan specifically, this peaceful stability 
implies Washington should not be anxious about Taiwan’s survival as Beijing will 
conduct itself in a disciplined, reactive and good neighborly way—if Taiwan’s 
independence movement remains benign, a possibility should Washington decrease 
support.  Finally, this peaceful stability will provide Northeast Asia with an opportunity 
to take a more active role in the UN during responses to issues around the world, much 
like the roles the United States and Europe fill today.  For the United States specifically, a 
peaceful and stable Asia implies more prosperity for its own citizens.    
The final category involves Washington’s approach toward North Korea.  
Regardless of which mentality Washington uses, Beijing’s reasons for pursuing a 
relationship with Seoul implies Washington will not bring Kim Jong Il’s regime to an 
end.  As long as Beijing and Seoul agree on their approach toward keeping the reclusive 
regime afloat, Washington’s hard-line approach will be ineffective.   
The growing relationship between South Korea and China in general can imply 
the building of a bridge between the United States and China through South Korea.  
South Korea serves as the “common denominator” in the relationship between China and 
the United States.  Since “the Korean issue…represents an area where the interests of the 
United States and China converge,” former ROK Foreign Minister, Han Sung-Joo, 
believes South Korea can serve as the bridge between the two powers.356  The growing 
relationship between South Korea and China implies for Washington an avenue to engage 
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Beijing rather than contain it.  It implies a place and role for the United States in the 
changing power structure of Northeast Asia.   
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
China remains acutely aware of its “hundred years of humiliation” at the hands of 
the Western powers and will likely not endure it a second time.  Therefore, Washington’s 
role will decline considerably if it continues on its current course of action in Northeast 
Asia.  Typically, Washington has disregarded historical implications and the national 
interests of the countries involved when determining policy toward this region.  To 
continue on such a path may prove disastrous.  U.S. policy makers should consider 
China’s historical role as the leader in Asia and Chinese and Korean distrust of Japan 
when determining options for its Asian policy.  As China makes its way toward its 
traditional leadership position in Asia, Washington should develop a better foundation of 
trust and cooperation with China.  It should use the bridge South Korea creates to engage 
China.  This bridge will not only improve relations between China and the United States, 
but it will also ensure Washington maintains a role in the changing political structure of 
Asia.  David Kang puts the necessity of this bridge in perspective: 
The alliances that a united Korea chooses could tilt the regional balance in 
any number of ways.  A realist view would predict that China would pose 
the greatest threat to a unified Korea, and that a unified Korea would 
remain a staunch U.S. and Japanese ally to balance China’s power.  In 
contrast, the implication of hierarchy would be that unified Korea will 
accommodate and coexist with China, and that the U.S. might be the odd 
man out.357 
With anti-American sentiment intensifying in South Korea, alongside the rise of 
Korean nationalism358—which Beijing respects, winning the Chinese government more 
trust and respect from Koreans—the United States could potentially lose its ground.  
Furthermore, as Chinese and South Korean technology finds its way into North Korea, 
North Koreans will be exposed to a “much more favorable picture of China than of the 
United States.…[and] will also find Korean cyberspace to be highly critical of the United 
States,” hindering the United States from gaining any positive ground with the North 
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Koreans.  Similarly, since South Korea and China are more economically engaged with 
North Korea than the United States is, North Koreans will be exposed more to their 
cultural products than to Western culture.359  At the same time, heavy anti-Japanese 
propaganda in China could potentially fuel anti-Japan sentiments on the Korean 
peninsula as China’s power and influence rises.   
Keeping Asian sensitivities in mind (China as a leader and distrust for Japan), 
supporting Taiwan may possibly further alienate Washington and antagonize the anti-
American sentiment.  A more probable alienation stems from Washington’s alliance with 
Japan.  Americans showed their insensitivity to the South Koreans when after liberation 
from the Japanese in 1945, the Americans kept many of the same Japanese working in 
South Korea.  South Koreans interpreted this action to mean Washington preferred South 
Korea to remain under brutal Japanese influence, a notion that still stirs in the minds of 
South Koreans whenever Washington strengthens its ties with Tokyo.  Today, with such 
a strong distrust in both Korea and China for Japan, the United States government 
continues to demonstrate its disregard for history and cultural sensitivity when it 
strengthens its ties to Japan, which alienates itself and gives the impression it wants a 
more “militaristic” Japan to lead Asia.   
Thus as the power structure in Northeast Asia changes, Washington should look 
to adjust its policy that takes history and cultural sensitivities into consideration if its 
leaders desire to remain a great power in the region.  The Asian countries have seemed to 
accept they cannot stop China from growing, or, do not view China’s growth as a threat 
because “China is likely to act within bounds acceptable to the other Asian nations.”360  
Perhaps Washington should embrace the same view, unless, of course, Beijing starts to 
exhibit expansionist tendencies.  Ultimately, Washington should try to improve South 
Korean confidence regarding the United States by taking steps to decrease anti-American 
sentiment in South Korea, and to strengthen alliance and cultural ties.  Toward China, 
and North Korea for that matter, Washington should try to find ways to increase trust 
with them.  With these issues in mind, following are six policy recommendations for the 
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United States with the goals of maintaining an influence in Northeast Asia, ensuring 
Northeast Asia is stable and eliminating the threat from North Korea.  To pursue these 
policy recommendations, Washington must accept a non-zero-sum mentality and that 
China does not pose a threat. 
The first and most important step American leaders should take is to reciprocate 
Beijing’s actions by normalizing relations with North Korea, and simultaneously, to 
moderate its approach toward the Hermit Kingdom.361  Doing so would significantly 
reduce North Korea’s threat perception of the United States, bringing the two Koreas 
closer to reconciliation and reunification.  Moderating its approach to become more in 
line with Seoul’s approach would also help to improve relations with Seoul, therefore, 
increasing Washington’s presence on the peninsula.  Reciprocating Beijing’s actions may 
also serve as a stepping stone toward improving relations with China.  Washington 
should also try to increase trust and confidence and lower the threat perception in North 
Korea.  It may be able to accomplish such an action by engaging North Korea in the same 
manner South Korea has:  slowly and with no intention of destroying the country.  
Secondly, the United States should aim to decrease anti-American sentiment in 
South Korea.  Normalizing with North Korea may help; but at the same time, the 
American government, military and business sectors can do much more.  Specifically, the 
United States government can improve its outreach via the embassy and cultural centers.  
It can also loosen visa restrictions for students interested in studying in the United States, 
or can even eliminate the visa requirement like it has with Japan362, and can create other 
incentives to encourage Korean students to attend school here.  The government can also 
change its foreign policy approach, increasing amicable diplomatic visits and taking steps 
toward strengthening the alliance and friendship.  The U.S. military can take steps to 
decrease anti-American sentiment by increasing cultural awareness amongst its members 
in an attempt to prevent “brash” American behavior—such awareness programs exist for 
members stationed in other countries, such as Turkey.  After normalization of relations 
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with North Korea, the U.S. military could allow members to bring their families to Korea 
with them in order to raise the morale of the troops.   
While the business sector may not take the initiative on its own, the U.S. 
government can provide incentives for businesses to help create more of a connection 
between South Korea and the United States.  For example, the government can subsidize 
airline tickets between South Korea and the United States, encouraging separated Korean 
families (and American military families) to visit each other more often.  Since the 
United States holds the second highest number of overseas Koreans—much of it due to 
the American presence in South Korea—cheaper transportation costs may harvest 
appreciation as families can visit each other more often.  Essentially, Washington should 
take steps to persuade South Koreans it genuinely cares about South Korea’s interests.  
Many South Koreans see the United States’ support as flimsy at best; should it take steps 
to build trust and a positive image, the anti-American sentiment may dwindle, allowing 
Washington to increase its presence and influence in the outcome of events involving the 
Korean peninsula.  Showing South Korea it genuinely cares about its interests may also 
help convince Beijing that Washington has no ill intentions, i.e. containment, toward 
China. 
Third, Washington should work with South Korea as a bridge to build mutual 
trust between China and the United States.  As discussed earlier, Washington cannot 
ignore Beijing’s growing role on the Korean peninsula, and it must accept that the 
relationship will continue to grow.  Taking steps to increase mutual trust with China may 
eliminate the perception of threat in the United States, the prospects of another Cold War, 
and will put Washington on amicable terms with the new power structure in Northeast 
Asia.  Since both Beijing and Washington share interests involving the Korean peninsula, 
the growing relationship between an ally and China can prove beneficial to Washington.  
More specifically, Washington can draw on South Korea as a bridge toward building 
mutual trust with China by asking Seoul to organize and host confidence building 
measures.  Seoul can also serve as the mediator who can help convey to Beijing 
Washington’s viewpoint on issues and vice versa.  Such a step may also boost relations 
between Seoul and Washington since Washington’s request for Seoul’s role in building 
mutual trust with Beijing would signify to Koreans Washington’s confidence in South 
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Korea.  At the same time, if Washington has Seoul helping it to build trust with Beijing, 
other Asian countries may not view Washington as instigating a rivalry and may also help 
the United States. 
A fourth recommendation for the United States regarding steps it should take in 
response to its potential alienation in Northeast Asia is to find ways to ease the fears of 
China and Korea about Japan’s possible remilitarization.  Since all the countries in 
Northeast Asia and most scholars concede the United States provides stability in the 
region through security, Japan’s remilitarization seems unnecessary.  If Tokyo does 
decide to remilitarize, Washington should find ways to alleviate the concerns of the 
region.  With the anti-American sentiment rising, simply saying it will keep Japan 
restrained will not suffice.  Washington should look to create avenues to build trust 
between the other nations and a remilitarized Japan in order to keep security stable in the 
region.  Doing so may also increase Washington’s standing with the other nations. 
Fifth, Washington should encourage Taiwan to follow in the footsteps of Hong 
Kong by accepting the one country/two systems proposal.  Doing so will eliminate much 
of the potential antagonism between Beijing and Washington, improving relations in turn.  
The two system idea seems to work for Hong Kong; therefore, the Washington should 
have no fear it would not work with Taiwan.  Even if Taiwan resisted the idea, 
encouragement from Washington may quell the independence movement leading to 
improved ties with Beijing for both Taipei and Washington.   
Finally, Washington should develop formal plans for a unified Korea (under 
several possible contingencies).  At the very minimum, Washington should genuinely 
acknowledge to itself the probability of unification.  Doing so will help Washington to be 
more decisive and more supportive of Seoul’s endeavors toward engagement.  It will also 
help Washington’s approach toward the peninsula to be less sporadic.  This support will 
help Seoul—and by extension, Beijing—to be more receptive to Washington’s 
viewpoints on the situation.  In the end, a definitive plan of action for the United States 
will help to ensure a stable Northeast Asia.      
Some of these policy recommendations and examples may seem extreme; 
however, the implications of the growing relationship between South Korea and China 
112 
merit drastic changes in Washington’s foreign policy approach toward the Northeast 
Asian region.  While Seoul does not seem likely to cut its ties with the United States 
anytime soon, Washington must improve its relations with China in order to maintain its 
influence in the region before it is too late.  It has always taken a haphazard view toward 
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